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Abstract
Against the backdrop of continuing adjustment in EU labour markets in response to the 
Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis, the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB) conducted the third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey in 2014-15 
as a follow-up to the two previous WDN waves carried out in 2007 and 2009. The WDN 
survey collected information on wage-setting practices at the fi rm level. This third wave 
sampled about 25,000 fi rms in 25 European countries with the aim of assessing how fi rms 
adjusted wages and employment in response to the various shocks and labour market 
reforms that took place in the European Union (EU) during the period 2010-13. This paper 
summarises the main results of WDN3 by identifying some patterns in fi rms’ adjustments 
and labour market reforms. It seeks to lay out the main lessons learnt from the survey 
in terms of both the general response of EU labour markets to the crisis and how these 
responses varied across the countries that took part in the survey.
Keywords: Wage Dynamics Network, Survey data, Labour market adjustment, Labour 
market reforms.
JEL classifi cation: E24, J30, J52, J68.
Resumen
En el contexto de un ajuste continuado de los mercados de trabajo de la UE en respuesta a 
la gran recesión y la crisis de la deuda soberana, el Sistema Europeo de Bancos Centrales 
(SEBC) llevó a cabo la tercera ola de la encuesta de la Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) 
entre 2014 y 2015, como continuación de las dos olas previas realizadas en 2007 y 2009. 
Esta encuesta recopiló información sobre las prácticas de fi jación de salarios a nivel de 
empresa para 25.000 empresas en 25 países europeos con el objetivo de evaluar cómo 
las empresas europeas ajustaron los salarios y el empleo en respuesta a las diversas 
perturbaciones económicas y reformas laborales que tuvieron lugar en la Unión Europea 
(UE) entre 2010 y 2013. Este documento resume los principales resultados de esta tercera 
ola de la encuesta de la WDN identifi cando algunos patrones en los ajustes realizados 
por las empresas y el impacto de las reformas del mercado de trabajo. El objetivo es esbozar 
las principales lecciones aprendidas de la encuesta tanto en relación con la respuesta 
agregada de los mercados de trabajo de la UE a la crisis como sobre la heterogeneidad 
entre los distintos países europeos.
Palabras claves: Wage Dynamics Network, encuestas a empresas, ajuste del mercado laboral, 
reformas del mercado de trabajo.
Códigos JEL: E24, J30, J52, J68.
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Executive summary
Against the backdrop of continuing adjustment in EU labour markets in response to the Great 
Recession and the sovereign debt crisis, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
conducted the third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey in 2014-15. This was 
a follow-up to the two previous WDN survey waves carried out in 2007 (WDN1, which covered 
the period 2002-07) and 2009 (WDN2, which covered the period 2008-09). The WDN survey 
collects information on wage-setting practices at the fi rm level. This third wave (WDN3) sampled 
about 25,000 fi rms in 25 European countries with the aim of assessing how fi rms adjusted 
wages and employment in response to the various shocks and labour market reforms that took 
place in the European Union (EU) during the period 2010-13. This paper summarises the main 
results of WDN3.
There is considerable heterogeneity across the 25 EU countries covered by WDN3 in 
terms of their business cycle position and their labour market performance during the period 2010-
13. In order to facilitate the analysis, the sample is split into those countries where unemployment 
was falling and GDP increasing (Group I), those countries where the unemployment rate increased 
even though GDP increased (Group II), and those countries where unemployment was rising and 
GDP was falling (Group III).
The paper fi rst analyses how EU fi rms reacted to negative demand and fi nancial 
shocks in terms of labour input – at both the intensive (i.e. average hours) and extensive (i.e. 
employment) margins – and wages. As expected, negative demand shocks are highly correlated 
with a negative adjustment in employment – especially in permanent employment and, to a 
lesser extent, in temporary employment – and in hours worked per employee. This pattern is 
found to be fairly homogeneous across country groups, although the adjustment in permanent 
employment is somewhat larger and the change in hours worked per employee is slightly smaller 
in Group II countries. Diffi culties in terms of access to fi nance also increase the likelihood of 
employment adjustments, although the effect is much smaller than in the case of demand 
shocks.
In the case of wages, although negative shocks also increase the probability of wage 
adjustments, the impact is much lower than on labour input adjustments, confi rming that fi rms 
used labour input adjustment strategies much more frequently than wage adjustment strategies. 
Regarding heterogeneity across countries, fi rms in countries with increasing unemployment 
(Group II and Group III) are signifi cantly less likely to adjust base wages in the event of a demand 
shock than are countries in Group I.
WDN3 provides information about the different instruments used by fi rms to reduce 
labour input. In general, EU fi rms used a wide variety of strategies, with the intensity of use 
of a given strategy determined by country-specifi c labour market institutions. In this regard, 
some differences appear across country groups. Collective dismissals were used relatively more 
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often in Group III countries, while individual dismissals were more likely to be used in Group I 
countries than in the other two groups. Temporary lay-offs were more often used by fi rms in 
Group II countries, while subsidised reductions of working hours were especially relevant in 
countries such as Germany (Group I) and Italy (Group III). Finally, a large share of fi rms in almost 
all countries stopped hiring.
WDN3 also provides information enabling an assessment of the features of wage-
setting and wage dynamics. EU fi rms most typically adjust wages once a year. Around 49% of 
fi rms in the 25 EU countries sampled report that, during the period 2010-13, they changed their 
employees’ base wages once a year, while 40% changed them less frequently. The frequency of 
wage changes in EU countries was lower during the period 2010-13 than during the pre-crisis 
period (2002-07). This seems to be at least partially attributable to the resistance of fi rms to 
lower base wages, i.e. to the prevalence of downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR).
DNWR was indeed prevalent during the period 2010-13, in spite of the length and 
intensity of the crisis. Nominal base wage cuts are extremely rare among EU fi rms, and this was 
the case even during the crisis. Meanwhile, the percentage of fi rms that reported having frozen 
base wages increased dramatically with the crisis, reaching its peak during the period 2008-09, 
before declining over the period 2010-13. Nevertheless, the evidence from the various WDN 
waves implies that although DNWR is prevalent in most countries, it can decline substantially in 
the case of very strong negative shocks. DNWR decreased strongly in countries which suffered 
GDP declines of 10% or more. This applies to Estonia in the period 2008–09 and to Greece and 
Cyprus in 2010–13.
Finally, the WDN3 survey collects information that permits an evaluation of the relevance 
of recent labour market reforms that are deemed to affect labour market adjustments. Labour 
market reforms have taken place in many EU countries. However, refl ecting not only heterogeneity 
in the response to shocks but also differences in institutions, the composition of measures 
adopted also differed. The measures and reforms introduced could be roughly categorised as 
follows: During the initial phase of the crisis – 2007-10 – many countries adopted measures that 
aimed to maintain employment and provide a safety net for the most vulnerable workers. As the 
crisis progressed over the period 2010-13, more in-depth reforms were adopted with the aim 
of making labour markets more effi cient – thereby reducing unemployment in the medium run – 
and increasing competitiveness. This was particularly the case in those countries characterised 
by continuously disappointing labour market outcomes and structural ineffi ciencies.
More specifi cally, the largest and most wide-ranging changes occurred in the southern 
European countries that suffered the most severe shocks in terms of GDP and unemployment. 
In the southern European countries under an adjustment program (Greece, Spain and Portugal), 
the adjustment of employment became more fl exible, the wage-setting system became less 
centralised, and measures to reduce labour costs and increase employment were also adopted, 
for example sub-minimum wages for young people in Greece, subsidies for new recruits in 
Spain, and a freeze in the minimum wage in Portugal. A substantial percentage of fi rms in these 
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countries where signifi cant labour market reforms were implemented found it easier to adjust 
both employment and wages in 2013 than in 2010, and they attributed this to reforms and 
changes in labour laws.
When it comes to remaining obstacles to employment creation, WDN3 showed that 
economic uncertainty and high payroll taxes are major obstacles to hiring workers on open-
ended contracts for a high share of fi rms in many EU countries. Skill shortages that relate to 
other structural policies such as education also appear to be an obstacle to hiring workers on 
open-ended contracts in many EU countries.
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1 Introduction
The Great Recession that followed the fi nancial crisis of 2007-08 resulted in large falls in output 
and rises in unemployment across Europe. Certain euro area countries experienced particularly 
large rises in unemployment in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis and engaged in structural 
reforms of their labour markets to become more competitive.
Against the backdrop of continuing adjustment in EU labour markets in response to the 
Great Recession and the sovereign debt crisis, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
conducted the third wave of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN) survey in 2014-15 as a follow-up 
to the two previous WDN survey waves carried out in 2007 and 2009.1 The WDN survey collects 
information on wage-setting practices at the fi rm level.2 This third wave (WDN3) sampled about 
25,000 fi rms in 25 European countries with the aim of assessing how fi rms adjusted wages and 
employment to the various shocks and labour market reforms that took place in the European 
Union (EU) during the period 2010-13.3 Detailed results of the survey are available in individual 
reports on each of the countries participating. This paper summarises the main results of WDN3 
by identifying patterns in fi rms’ adjustments and labour market reforms. It focuses on fi rms 
that have more than fi ve workers and operate in the following sectors: manufacturing, energy, 
construction, trade and transportation, market services and fi nancial intermediation.4
More specifi cally, this paper seeks to lay out the main lessons learnt from the survey in 
terms of both the general response of EU labour markets to the crisis and how these responses 
varied across the several countries that took part in the survey. Given the large heterogeneity 
across the 25 EU countries covered by WDN3 in terms of their labour market performance, 
Section 2 starts by producing a taxonomy of countries. Section 3 describes the main shocks that 
caused the crisis, as they were perceived by fi rms, and the sources of rigidities, identifi ed in the 
fi rms’ responses to the survey, that conditioned their transmission mechanisms. Section 4 looks 
at how labour costs responded to the different shocks, with a focus on employment adjustments 
and the methods used for these. Section 5 focuses on wage adjustments and, in particular, on 
the extent to which downward nominal wage rigidities act as a potential impediment to cutting 
labour costs. Section 6 considers labour market reforms during the period 2010-13 and focuses 
in particular on how fi rms perceived (and reacted) to them. The section also provides information 
on the remaining labour market rigidities identifi ed by the survey. Finally, Section 7 concludes.5
1  The fi rst, second and third waves of the WDN survey are referred to as WDN1, WDN2 and WDN3 respectively. See 
Babecký et al. (2012), Bertola et al. (2012), Druant et al. (2012) and Galuscak et al. (2012) for an overview of WDN1 
evidence and Fabiani et al. (2015) for a summary of the main fi ndings of WDN2.
2  The WDN survey collects information that enables researchers to examine the effects on wage, employment and price 
adjustments of fi rm characteristics as well as of the economic environment and institutional features of the countries in 
which the fi rms operate. The third wave of the WDN survey adds considerable value in that it also collects information 
that enables an evaluation of the incidence of the various shocks and the relevance of recent labour market reforms that 
are deemed to affect labour market adjustments.
3  Denmark, Finland and Sweden are the only three EU countries not covered by the WDN3 survey.
4  The WDN3 survey wave also covers non-market services and/or fi rms with no more than fi ve workers in some countries. 
See Annex 1 for general information on the WDN survey as well as for details on the features of WDN3.
5  This paper provides an overview of the main developments with the aim of synthesising the evidence by country groups. 
Since, however, individual countries’ experiences may differ even within these broadly defi ned groups, the country 
reports, should be consulted for an in-depth analysis of responses.
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2 A taxonomy of the countries participating in WDN3
Neither the crisis nor the incidence of labour market reforms affected all countries with the 
same intensity or at the same time. To permit a systematic comparison of the survey results, 
the paper fi rst provides a brief comparative review of the labour market performance of the 
countries in the sample. The subsequent sections use country groupings based on the evolution 
of unemployment and GDP for the purpose of cross-country comparisons.
The most striking development in EU labour markets during the crisis was the widening 
of unemployment differentials across countries. Chart 1 shows the range of unemployment rates 
in the EU28 during the period 2007-14 and illustrates that the difference between the average 
of the unemployment rates in the countries with the lowest rates and that in the countries with 
the highest rates increased from around 5 percentage points in 2007 to around 13 percentage 
points in 2010 and to 16 percentage points in 2013.
Cross-country differences in labour market performance during the period 2010-13, 
which is the period covered by WDN3, were not confi ned to the evolution of unemployment. 
There are also notable differences in the change in labour participation rates and in working 
hours per employee, as shown in Charts 2a and 2b. In most countries the participation 
rate increased over the period from 2010 to 2013 (the exceptions being Croatia, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Denmark, Belgium and Greece). Even in countries that saw a large rise in the 
unemployment rate, participation rates increased signifi cantly, something that was observed 
neither in previous recessions in Europe nor in the United States during the Great Recession. 
As for working hours per employee, these increased signifi cantly only in Ireland, Belgium, 
the United Kingdom and Greece, but among the countries where they fell there was wide 
heterogeneity (see Chart 2b).
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Since not all countries experienced the economic and fi nancial crisis with the same 
intensity, this divergence is not surprising. What is more surprising, however, is that the negative 
relationship between the unemployment rate and GDP growth (normally referred to as “Okun’s 
law”) shows some variation across countries. To illustrate this fact, Chart 3a plots the changes 
in the unemployment rate against the changes in output for the 28 EU countries plus the United 
States as well as for the EU and the euro area as a whole. It does so for the whole period 2007-13, 
as well as for the two sub-periods 2007-10 and 2010-13, which roughly correspond to the two 
phases of the recent crisis, i.e. the Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis. All 
but a handful of countries experienced falling output and rising unemployment (i.e. a fall in the 
top left quadrant) over the period 2007-10, with four – Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Spain – 
experiencing rises in the unemployment rate of more than 10 percentage points. Taking these 
countries as a group, Okun’s law seems to hold, with a 1% fall in GDP being associated with 
a 0.43 percentage point rise in the unemployment rate. As for the sub-periods, this coeffi cient 
is slightly higher (0.49) for 2007-10, while for 2010-13 – when most countries were fi rmly in 
a recovery phase, with GDP growing and the unemployment rate generally falling, but seven 
countries were still experiencing falling GDP and rising unemployment – it was 0.53.
SOURCES: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey.
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This evidence thus suggests a simple taxonomy of countries as regards their 
unemployment and GDP performance during the European sovereign debt crisis (2010-13):
— Group I: countries where the unemployment rate decreased and GDP increased 
(the Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Slovakia and the United Kingdom)
SOURCE: Eurostat, national accounts and EU Labour Force Survey.
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— Group II: countries where the unemployment rate increased even though GDP 
increased (Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 
Poland and Romania)
— Group III: countries where the unemployment rate increased and GDP declined 
(Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal and Slovenia).
Chart 3b shows average year-on-year GDP growth and the average change in the 
unemployment rate in each country group. Average increases in unemployment are much larger 
among Group III countries than in the other two groups, while the average annual growth rates 
of GDP are clearly smaller. Group I countries reduced their unemployment rates on average 
during the period 2011-13, and GDP growth remained positive every year in both Group I and 
Group II countries.
Several factors may explain this heterogeneity. One is the intensity and timing of the 
shock(s) and/or heterogeneity in the transmission across fi rm characteristics and sectors of 
SOURCES: Eurostat, national accounts and EU Labour Force Survey.
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activity, given that the fi rm/sectoral structure of the economy differs across countries. Countries 
may also differ in terms of the margins of adjustment (e.g. labour input versus wages; intensive 
versus extensive margin), as the labour market institutions conditioning the adjustments differ 
considerably across countries, and this has implications for the speed at which shocks are 
propagated through the economy and their overall persistence. The subsequent sections of 
the paper use the classifi cation suggested by Chart 3a to show cross-country differences in 
the incidence of shocks, fi rms’ adjustments to them and the effects of labour market reforms 
as measured by WDN3. Although there are other ways to classify the countries, based on, say, 
labour market institutions or whether or not countries were subject to an IMF/EU adjustment 
programme, this classifi cation has the advantage of simplicity and clarity and neatly summarises 
the different experiences of these countries between 2010 and 2013.
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3 Demand shocks and limited access to finance in Europe 
WDN3 provides qualitative information on fi rms’ perceptions of the nature, size and persistence 
of shocks hitting them during the period 2010-13. (For some countries this information is also 
available for the period 2008-10.) The information on the sources of shocks is extensive. A set of 
questions investigates demand shocks, distinguishing between domestic and external demand 
shocks, and demand volatility. Another set of questions analyses diffi culties in accessing 
external fi nance, the impact of fi nancing costs, and access to bank credit (availability and cost) 
by main purpose: credit for new investment projects, for refi nancing debt and for fi nancing 
working capital. Finally, the questionnaire also includes questions about changes in the costs 
and availability of (usual) supplies and changes in customers’ ability to pay.6
The following section summarises the average size of several shocks as perceived 
by fi rms (weighted by employment).7 The scale of the fi rms’ potential responses has been 
normalised such that 0 is “no change”, so that negative (positive) values correspond to negative 
(positive) shocks8. The averages for each country are computed after controlling for fi rm size and 
sector,9 considering only fi rms in the private sector with at least fi ve employees.10
Chart 4 summarises these measures of shocks regarding the level and volatility of demand 
and its composition between domestic and external demand, access to external fi nance and changes 
in fi nancing costs,11 customers’ ability to pay and the availability of supplies (averages by country, after 
removing size and sector effects). The chart shows that in Group III countries, in which unemployment 
increased and GDP decreased, negative demand, negative fi nance and the worsening of customers’ 
ability to pay played a greater role. Group I countries, by contrast, experienced an expansion in demand 
and, in general, also faced improvements in access to fi nance and in customers’ ability to pay. Group 
II countries were in an intermediate position for almost all types of shock. Finally, the availability of 
supplies worsened for all countries (except for the United Kingdom), so it is unlikely that this kind of 
shock helps to explain cross-country heterogeneity in labour market adjustments. These shocks are, 
of course, correlated with one another. In particular, the shock related to customers’ ability to pay is 
highly correlated with both access to fi nance and demand shocks (with correlation coeffi cients of 0.37 
and 0.44 respectively), while the variable measuring the availability of supplies correlates with all other 
shocks (with a correlation coeffi cient of around 0.30). The remainder of the paper thus focuses only on 
shocks to the level of demand (total) and diffi culties in accessing external fi nancing.
6   For each shock fi rms must refer to the “most signifi cant changes” taking place over the reference period and are asked 
to provide a qualitative evaluation of the sign and intensity of each shock as measured on a scale from 1 (“strong 
decrease”) to 5 (“strong increase”), with 3 being “unchanged”, 2 being “moderate decrease” and 4 being “moderate 
increase”. For the questions about the availability of credit at high costs, the scale goes from 1 (“not relevant”) to 4 
(“very relevant”), with 2 being “of little relevance” and 4 being “relevant”.
7   These averages are weighted by the employment weights provided by the survey
8   The scale is as follows: –2 = strong decrease; –1 = moderate decrease; 0 = no change; 1 = moderate increase; and 2 = 
strong increase. The survey contains three questions on fi nancing costs. To create a unique index, the variable is fi rst rescaled, 
e.g. for the availability of credit at high costs, –2 = very high costs of credit; –1 = moderate costs; 0 = very low restrictions due 
to the cost of credit; 1 = no restriction at all. The sum of the answers to the three questions is then calculated.
9   The indices used in the fi gures are residuals of an OLS regression which includes sector and size dummies.
10  This cut-off is likely to be important in some countries where a considerable proportion of fi rms have fewer than fi ve employees.
11  Financing costs are an indirect measure of the shock experienced by fi rms. In the context of a generalised increase in the 
diffi culty of accessing credit, changes in fi nancing costs signal the relevance of this component in the total costs of fi rms.
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SOURCE: WDN3.
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Charts 5a, 5b and 5c provides information on the incidence of negative shocks to 
demand and access to fi nance across fi rm size and sectors. It focuses on two size classes 
– large fi rms, i.e. those with more than 50 employees, and small fi rms, i.e. those with 5 to 50 
employees – and three sectors: industry, construction and private services. Chart 5a shows 
the deviation from unity of the ratio of the average probabilities of suffering the corresponding 
shock in large versus small fi rms. Positive values signal that the ratio is greater than one, i.e. 
that the shock is more frequent among large fi rms. Chart 5b and 5c, respectively, compare the 
incidence of shocks in the services sector with that in the industrial sector and in construction. 
These charts clearly show that negative shocks mostly affected small fi rms, as well as fi rms in 
the construction sector. This is to be expected, as these fi rms are more exposed to domestic 
demand weakness and are typically more credit-constrained. The chart also shows, however, 
the presence of country heterogeneity: for instance, in Portugal, Slovenia and Malta large fi rms 
suffered credit constraints more frequently than small fi rms.
There is concern that this qualitative information regarding fi rms’ perceptions of 
economic conditions may not be useful, since it is often not related to actual changes in 
economic conditions. However, in the case of the information provided by WDN3, a strong 
correlation is found between WDN3 measures of shocks and actual GDP growth and changes 
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SOURCE: WDN3.
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FIRMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THE DEMAND SHOCK AND CHANGES IN GDP GROWTH 
AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (2010-2013) (a)
SOURCE: Eurostat and WDN3.
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FIRMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF ACCESS TO EXTERNAL FINANCE AND CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
AND GDP GROWTH (2010-2013) (a) (b)
SOURCE: Eurostat and WDN3.
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in the unemployment rate across countries. Charts 6a and 6b provide these correlations for 
two different types of shock: demand and access to external fi nance, respectively. In addition, 
Table 1 presents the results of simple OLS cross-country regressions of these two macro 
variables on the WDN3 measures of shocks, which suggest that there is indeed a strong cross-
country statistical association with economic meaning between fi rms’ perceptions of shocks, 
as measured by WDN3, and macroeconomic performance, as measured by GDP growth and 
changes in the unemployment rate. These correlations also suggest that the microdata from the 
survey can be used to explain at least part of the cross-country heterogeneity observed in the 
EU during the crisis (see also Boeri and Jimeno, 2016).
Firms’ perceptions of access to external fi nance and changes in unemployment rate 
and GDP growth (2010-13)12
12  The index measuring access to external fi nance has been multiplied by –1, with higher values indicating less diffi culty 
with regard to access to fi nance.
Slope Constant Adjusted R-squared Slope Constant Adjusted R-squared
906.0)7.1( 71.0-)3.4( 31.0475.0)9.1( 21.0)8.3( 70.0-dnameD
Volatility/uncertainty of demand -0.10 (5.6) 0.02 (0.7) 0.579 0.18 (6.4) -0.00 (1.0) 0.633
Domestic demand -0.08 (4.2) 0.18 (2.3) 0.656 0.14 (5.2) -0.27 (2.3) 0.725
293.0)6.1( 42.0-)0.4( 72.0514.0)7.1( 51.0)2.4( 71.0-dnamed lanretxE
 BBDRRSNjM@MBe -0.13 (5.0) -0.02 (0.3) 0.617 0.23 (6.3) 0.02 (0.3) 0.726
525.0)7.4( 44.0-)8.2( 21.0-944.0)1.4( 42.0)8.2( 70.0stsoc gnicnaniF
stneiciffeoc htworg PDGstneiciffeoc etar tnemyolpmenU
SHOCKS, GDP GROWTH AND CHANGES IN UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (2010-2013) TABLE 1
NOTE: t-stat in brackets.
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4 Firms’ reaction to shocks: labour cost adjustments
The size, intensity and variety of shocks affecting EU fi rms between 2010 and 2013 caused deep 
changes in the economic structure of countries and in fi rms’ strategies. Firms may react to the new 
economic situation by adjusting prices, costs – including labour and non-labour costs – and/or output 
and margins. This section analyses fi rms’ reactions in terms of labour costs. WDN3 provides unique 
data for this purpose. It can also be seen as an important source of information for the evaluation of 
many other issues, such as the impact of shocks on competitiveness, the impact of credit shocks 
on total costs, and, for a subset of countries, the relationship between shocks, costs and price 
adjustments. Nevertheless, several shortcomings should be borne in mind. As with any other cross-
sectional dataset, it only contains information on fi rms that were in the market at the time the data 
were collected, in this case those fi rms that survived the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, responses 
may be infl uenced by the specifi c macroeconomic environment prevailing at the time of the survey.
This section examines the relationship between shocks to demand and credit 
conditions and the reactions of fi rms in terms of the various components of labour costs, namely 
employment (including working hours) and wages, with a focus on the incidence of lay-offs as an 
employment adjustment mechanism. The subsequent section focuses on wage adjustment. 13
4.1 Labour cost adjustments: a macroeconomic view
Chart 7 plots the dynamics of total hours worked, as reported in national accounts, in the euro area, 
in the 28 EU countries and in the three groups of countries considered in this paper. The adjustment 
of hours is not infl uenced by changes in the participation rate or in the intensive use of labour and 
can provide a direct measure of the reduction of labour input in private sector fi rms. Once again, the 
fi gure confi rms the high degree of heterogeneity across country groups. Group III countries severely 
reduced labour input from 2010 to 2013 (before it stabilised in 2014). In Group I countries, labour 
input stabilised after increasing in 2011. Group II countries registered a modest fall.
13  For a detailed analysis of credit restrictions and labour costs, see also Bodnár et al. (2016).
SOURCE: Eurostat, national accounts.
a Each data point is an index calculated by setting the value recorded in 2010 equal to 100.
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CHART 7DYNAMICS OF HOURS WORKED IN EU COUNTRIES (2007-2014) (a)
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The dynamics of nominal and real hourly wages during the period under consideration 
were, by contrast, fairly homogeneous across countries (see Charts 8a and 8b), although 
Group III countries saw weaker wage developments after 2011. Nominal hourly wages rose 
continuously until 2013, with the exception of the period 2008-09, when they declined in Group 
I countries (owing to policies undertaken in the Baltic countries), in the United Kingdom and 
in Ireland. Real wages – i.e. nominal hourly wages defl ated by the HICP – stagnated almost 
everywhere after 2010.14 This evidence confi rms that the reaction of labour input was larger 
than the reaction of wages, probably due to the very large size of the shocks hitting the EU 
labour market. This hypothesis will be investigated more closely in the next section. The potential 
impact of downward nominal wage rigidities is discussed in Section 5.
14  A notable exception is Germany, where real wages have increased signifi cantly since 2010.
SOURCE: Eurostat, national accounts.
a Each data point is an index calculated by setting the value recorded in 2010 equal to 100.
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CHART 8aDYNAMICS OF NOMINAL HOURLY WAGES IN EU COUNTRIES (2007-2014) (a)
SOURCE: Eurostat, national accounts.
a Each data point is an index calculated by setting the value recorded in 2010 equal to 100.
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4.2 Labour cost adjustments through the WDN3 lenses
The WDN3 survey makes it possible to check empirically whether these adjustments (quite strong 
for labour input, fairly modest for wages) were related to demand and access to fi nance shocks. 
The survey includes various qualitative measures of labour input and wage adjustments. The survey 
focuses on the following outcomes: (1) permanent employment; (2) temporary employment; (3) 
hours per employee, (4) base wages, and (5) fl exible wage components. For each outcome fi rms 
are asked to report whether, during the period 2010-13, they registered: (a) a strong reduction; (b) 
a moderate reduction; (c) no change; (d) a moderate increase; or (e) a strong increase.
A linear regression is run for each component of labour costs, where the dependent 
variables are dummies indicating a strong or moderate decrease in the corresponding outcome. 
Covariates include sector and size dummies, dummies for country groups, and two dummies 
indicating a strong/moderate negative shock to demand and strong/moderate diffi culty in 
accessing fi nance. Shocks are also interacted with the country groups’ dummies. The results 
concerning employment adjustments are reported in Table 2; those regarding wage adjustments 
are reported in Table 3. The coeffi cients show the change in the probability of fi rms indicating a 
strong or moderate decrease in the dependent variable in response to a strong or moderate fall 
in demand/increased diffi culty in accessing fi nance.15
First, as expected, negative demand shocks are highly correlated with negative 
adjustments in permanent employment (i.e. fi rms are much more likely to reduce permanent 
employment if they face a strong or moderate fall in demand than if they do not), but the 
adjustment is larger in Group II countries.16 Diffi culties related to access to fi nance have an 
additional impact on the negative adjustment of permanent workers (column 2), although the 
effect is smaller than for demand shocks. This fi rst piece of evidence suggests that the size of 
the shock played a role in explaining the more intense decline in employment in Group III than 
in Groups I and II. Adverse demand and credit shocks are also positively correlated with the 
probability of reducing temporary workers and hours per employee. Interestingly, fi rms in Group 
II countries, i.e. countries where unemployment continued to grow after 2010, have a lower 
probability of reducing labour input on the intensive margin in response to a negative demand 
shock. This might explain why in these countries the probability of reducing labour input on the 
extensive margin was relatively high.
Heterogeneity across groups of countries emerges clearly also when adjustments in 
base wages are considered. Compared with fi rms in Group I countries, fi rms in countries with 
increasing unemployment (Group II and in particular Group III) are less likely to adjust base wages 
in the event of a decline in demand. Group III countries in particular did not cut wages at all, 
signalling the presence of downward wage rigidities. The response of fi rms to increased diffi culty 
in accessing fi nance is, by contrast, homogeneous across groups: fl exible wage components 
were adjusted more evenly across countries.
15  This simple exercise does not take into account potential interactions between different types of labour input adjustment 
after a shock.
16 Given that this relates to negative shocks leading to negative labour adjustments, coeffi cients are positive.
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4.3 Employment adjustments
WDN3 provides information about many different instruments that fi rms could use to reduce 
labour input or adjust its composition. Table 4 summarises this information by country and 
groups, providing the share of (employment-weighted) fi rms using a given instrument if they 
have reported a negative shock to demand or access to fi nance. The last column reports the 
average number of instruments used.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
***131.0***731.0***711.0***721.0***202.0***112.0kcohs dnameD
(8.802) (8.326) (6.052) (5.574) (7.066) (6.751)
***660.0-**750.0-210.0800.0***401.0***011.0II puorG*kcohs.meD
(3.337) (3.08) (0.265) (0.388) (-2.350) (-2.747)
900.0-600.0200.0820.0630.0-610.0-III puorG*kcohs.meD
(-0.305) (-0.710) (0.532) (0.047) (0.136) (-0.210)
**240.0***860.0**060.0ecnanif ot sseccA
)399.1()958.2()222.2(
330.0730.0-310.0II puorG*.nif ot sseccA
)730.1()830.1-()13.0(
630.060.0640.0III puorG*.nif ot sseccA
)327.0()960.1()618.0(
512,32512,32512,32512,32512,32512,32snoitavresbO
Reduction in hours per employeeReduction in temporary workersReduction in permanent workers
CHANGES IN LABOUR INPUT AND ADVERSE SHOCKS (LINEAR REGRESSIONS) TABLE 2
Notes: Robust z-statistics in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Weighted regressions using employment weights.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
***721.0***331.0***070.0***570.0kcohs dnameD
(5.924) (5.79) (7.304) (6.881)
310.0-600.0-**430.0-**430.0-II puorG*kcohs.meD
(-2.015) (-1.970) (-0.241) (-0.493)
810.0-210.0***290.0-***580.0-III puorG*kcohs.meD
(-2.781) (-2.891) (0.272) (-0.422)
**340.0***930.0ecnanif ot sseccA
)662.2()139.2(
120.0510.0-II puorG * .nif ot sseccA
)666.0()996.0-(
*090.0600.0III puorG *.nif ot sseccA
)167.1()12.0(
512,32512,32512,32512,32snoitavresbO
1DCTBSHNMHMkDWHAKDV@FDBNLONMDMS1DCTBSHNMHMA@RDV@FD
CHANGES IN WAGES AND ADVERSE SHOCKS (LINEAR REGRESSIONS) TABLE 3
NOTES: Robust z-statistics in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. WeiFGSed reFQessions usinF empKoyment VeiFGSs.
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It is clear that the intensity of use of a given instrument is determined by country-
specifi c labour market institutions. With this caveat in mind, the table fi rst shows a very high 
degree of heterogeneity across countries in the use of the instruments, but it also shows that the 
fi rms in the sample used a wide variety of strategies to adjust labour costs, the average number 
of instruments being higher than two in all country groups.
Collective
lay-offs
Individual 
lay-offs
Temporary
lay-offs
Subsidised
reduction of 
working
hours
Non-
subsidised
reduction of 
working
hours
Non-renewal
of temporary 
contracts at 
expiration
Early
retirement
schemes
Freeze or 
reduction of 
new
recruitment
Reduction of 
agency
workers and 
others
Average
number of 
instruments
used
Group I
6.23.729.469.311.749197.952.81ZC    
    DE 9 43.4 35 28.5 32.3 16.6 51 16.4 2.3
5.16.74.142.31.011.525.053.01EE    
    HU 13.3 34.3 11 6.7 12.5 22.1 13.6 35.5 12.2 1.6
    IE 18.8 36 17.3 16.8 35 18.8 5.6 52.3 17.8 2.2
9.08.72.8229.914.93.02z0.2TL    
5.11.51939.13.713.336.833.11VL    
    MT 12.1 15.3 12.9 34.3 20.3 12.6 46.5 3.6 1.6
    SK 29.8 67.8 13 9.1 7.1 31.1 25.1 67.9 24.9 2.8
    UK 28.7 56.7 5.9 23.8 19.1 46.7 28.2 2.1
Group II
    AT 15.1 33.9 15.6 5.3 32.5 2.6 2.8 55 41 2
    BE 9.6 43.2 47.2 6.1 12.9 30.6 18.9 71.3 41.1 2.8
    BG 26 56.2 36.7 14.3 11.8 23.5 7.6 59.5 10.4 2.5
    FR 20.5 38 5.8 13.5 26.7 46.6 5.7 73.9 51.2 2.8
    LU 3.9 39 5.7 7.1 13.8 33.2 8.3 52.5 41.4 2
    NL 17.4 39.5 3.3 1.9 7.2 50.6 9.7 58.9 44.2 2.3
    PL 6.8 63.1 17.1 11.9 28.8 61.2 23.3 76.3 38.2 3.3
    RO 25 53.7 15.6 11.8 30.5 34.7 12.1 65.7 20.5 2.7
Group III
    CY 22.7 37.4 13.2 4.4 25 21.2 10.2 58.1 2.2 1.9
    ES 9.7 56.9 25.4 15.4 19.2 56.1 20.5 37.3 19.5 2.6
    GR 4.5 36.5 3.3 1.3 30.6 17.8 7 62 24.4 1.9
    HR 24.2 47 9 3.5 22.8 43.4 36 43.4 28.9 2.6
5.38.646.778.411.744.034.56324.04TI    
    PT 18.2 40.5 5.3 29.3 64.9 16.3 80.3 36.2 2.8
    SI 13.6 44.6 8.6 10.9 9.7 47 19.7 51.2 20.1 2.3
Averages
    Group I 16.5 49.1 2.9 27.4 24.2 29.2 11.7 50.9 20.7 2.2
    Group II 17.1 43.3 11.5 9.3 20.9 45.6 10.4 68.6 43.9 2.7
    Group III 26.7 36.6 19.2 39.6 26.3 49.1 16.9 62.6 35.2 3
ADJUSTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
Proportion of ðrms experiencing a negative shock to demand or access to ðnance that used each instrument (2010-2013) 
TABLE 4
SOURCE: WDN3 survey.
NOTE: Figures are weighted to rekect overall employment and rescaled to exclude non-responses.
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With regard to the individual instruments, the probability of using collective dismissals 
is higher for Group III countries, while the use of individual dismissals is more likely for Group I 
countries than for the other two groups. It is important to note, however, that individual lay-offs 
are more prevalent than collective lay-offs across all countries (apart from Italy), even in countries 
where the costs of dismissal are high.
Temporary lay-offs are not a feature in all countries, but tend to be used more by fi rms in 
Group II and Group III countries. Only a few countries allow for the subsidised reduction of hours: 
this is the case in Germany, where this method was used by one out of three fi rms hit by a shock, 
and in Italy, where the share reached 65.4%. Finally, a large share of fi rms in almost all countries 
stopped recruiting new staff.17 Regarding the propensity to use the different instruments, fi rms 
in Group III countries were more likely to stop renewing temporary job contracts. Since shocks 
were mainly concentrated in small fi rms and in the services sector, where human capital is less 
fi rm-specifi c, fi rms more often laid off workers instead of adjusting the intensive margin of labour.
17  This means that fi rms were not benefi ting from potential wage adjustments through this channel, as the wages of newly 
hired workers might be more responsive to external labour market conditions than those of incumbents.
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5 Wage adjustments
The data collected in the three waves of the WDN survey make it possible to analyse whether 
wage adjustment practices have changed during the economic crisis.18 This paper focuses on 
two key aspects of wage-setting which have been used as the main indicators of wage rigidity in 
the related literature: a) the frequency of wage changes, which is an indicator of staggered wage 
adjustment, and b) downward nominal wage rigidity, with a focus on the rigidity of base wages.19
5.1 The institutional context: the coverage and centralisation of collective bargaining
Firms’ ability to adjust wages in response to negative shocks depends on labour market 
institutions. One of the most infl uential aspects of the institutional environment is the extent and 
centralisation of collective bargaining. However, given the scarcity of comparable information, 
it is diffi cult to obtain a good overview of collective bargaining.20 WDN1 and WDN3 collected 
information on the incidence, centralisation and coverage of collective wage agreements directly 
from fi rms. This provides an alternative data source to the existing ones and makes it possible 
to analyse the variation in collective bargaining coverage across fi rms and countries, as well as 
recent trends in collective bargaining centralisation, and to explore the relevance of bargaining 
institutions for labour market adjustments.
Table 5 gives an overview of collective bargaining in 2007 and 2013 on the basis of two 
waves of the WDN survey: WDN1 and WDN3. The incidence and centralisation of bargaining 
differ considerably across the three groups of countries. The countries in Group I have on 
average a much lower level of bargaining coverage and more decentralised bargaining systems. 
Approximately one-third (35%) of employees are covered by collective agreements in Group I 
countries on average, while the coverage is 75% in Group II and 91% in Group III countries. 
Regarding centralisation, about 30% of fi rms have higher-level collective bargaining agreements 
in Group I countries, while this share is 56% in Group II and 79% in Group III countries.21 It is 
noteworthy that these differences not only are apparent in a comparison of the group averages but 
also apply to almost all individual countries belonging to each group, with only a few exceptions. 
Two such exceptions are Bulgaria and Poland, which, although belonging to Group II, have very 
low bargaining coverage, and collective bargaining agreements are mostly signed at the fi rm level.
The differences in collective bargaining across groups suggest that the institutional 
environment for wage-setting may have infl uenced how countries recovered from the Great 
Recession. Group I countries experienced a signifi cant drop in real wages in 2007–09 (Chart 8b). 
This was partly the result of currency depreciations in the countries with fl exible exchange rates, 
18  WDN1, launched in 2007, collected information on the period 2002-07, WDN2, conducted in 2009 collected 
information for 2008-09, and fi nally WDN3, conducted in 2014-15, collected information about the period 2010-13.
19  A number of papers use WDN3 data to examine in detail wage adjustment issues and their relationship with institutions 
and incidence of shock. See Marotzke et al. (2017), Lamo et al. (2016), and Babecky et al. (2016).
20  An exception is the database in Visser (2016). For the euro area, see also ECB (2012) and du Caju et al. (2008).
21  The indicator of centralisation is the incidence of collective bargaining agreements that are signed outside the fi rm, i.e. 
at the sectoral, national or occupational level (second and sixth columns, Table 5).
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but some countries belonging to this group were also able to carry out “internal devaluations” 
by lowering the wages of employees (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Ireland). The decline in real 
wages in Group I countries is likely to have boosted their international competitiveness and 
helped them to recover faster from the Great Recession.
Firm level
Outside the 
jQL
Firm level or 
outside
Firm level
Outside the 
jQL
Firm level or 
outside
Group I countries
    Czech Republic 51.4 17.5 54 50.2 30.6 10 39 33.2
    Germany 16.1 47.2 56.9 48.3
2.83.1121.017.81.214.34.01ainotsE    
3.022.327.62.024.8191091yragnuH    
2.99.918.94.118.044.271.867.03dnalerI    
    Latvia 16.7 2.3 18.9 18.3
    Lithuania 23.7 0.8 24.2 15.6 17.4 1.9 18.2 16
    Malta 31 0.5 31 23.8
7.534.838.411.533.756.754.918.65aikavolS    
    United Kingdom 17.4 7.2 32.7 21.3
Total, group I 18.3 29.2 44 35.3
Group II countries
4.088.89884.725.498.792.694.32airtsuA    
4.4927368.038.784.999.793.53muigleB    
    Bulgaria 21.8 7 24.3 17.8
4.498.889.289.827.669.998.894.85ecnarF    
    Luxembourg 17.4 42.8 57 43.7 25.1 33.4 54.9 54
    Netherlands 30.1 45.4 75.5 67.6 51.5 54.6 79.7 90
9.029.0219.713.919.227.44.12dnaloP    
    Romania 69.4 7.7 73 71.6
Total, Group II 33.1 56.6 72.5 76
Group III countries
6.934.657.147.132.336.644.524.82surpyC    
3.692.593.77138.690011.389.61niapS    
4.171.068.242.62194.398.589.02eceerG    
    Croatia 35.4 23.3 45.2 47.1
995.99984.06796.996.999.24ylatI    
5.263.662.26313.559.168.856.9lagutroP    
4.979.689.579.750013.477.52ainevolS    
Total, Group III 39.3 78.9 91.1 90.8
7.067.3620.058.624.76676.463.33 latoT
WDN3 total for WDN1 
sample
31.7 63.2 74.9 75.9
3NDW1NDW
Collective bargaining agreements 
NEjQLR
Collective
bargaining
coverage
NEDLOKNXDDR
Collective bargaining agreements 
NEjQLR
Collective
bargaining
coverage
NEDLOKNXDDR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE, WDN1 AND WDN3, BY COUNTRY TABLE 5
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations on the basis of WDN1 and WDN3.
NOTES: Figures weighted to rekect overall employment and rescaled to exclude non-responses.
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The changes in collective bargaining between 2007 and 2013 can only be assessed 
for the subset of countries that participated in both WDN1 and WDN3. The evidence from other 
data sources has shown that there has been a general trend towards a decline in unionisation 
in recent decades (see Visser, 2016). The WDN data do not support this fi nding. The average 
incidence of union agreements across the surveyed countries has been stable, and collective 
bargaining coverage increased between 2007 and 2013. However, the average trends mask 
strongly divergent developments across individual countries. Collective bargaining coverage 
has substantially declined in some countries (e.g. Ireland and the Czech Republic), while it has 
increased in others (e.g. France and the Netherlands).
Some general trends can still be highlighted, in particular for the Group III countries that 
have suffered the most prolonged crises. The common tendency among this group is a decline 
in the centralisation of collective bargaining, indicated by an increase in the share of fi rm-level 
bargaining agreements (in all Group III countries for which there is comparative evidence) and by 
a decline in the incidence of higher-level bargaining contracts in some countries (Greece, Spain 
and Italy).
5.2 The frequency of wage changes
In the countries in the sample, fi rms most typically change wages once a year (see Table 6a). 
Around 88% of fi rms in the 25 EU countries in the sample report that during the period 2010-2013 
they changed their employees’ base wages once a year or less frequently (around 48% changed 
their employees’ base wages once a year, and 40% changed wages less frequently than once a 
year), while only 4% did so more frequently than once a year. A higher frequency of wage changes 
is observed among the countries in Group II, where the unemployment rate increased even though 
GDP increased, mainly because of Luxembourg and Belgium, where wage-setting is based on 
automatic indexation. The lowest frequency occurs among fi rms in countries in Group I, where 
the vast majority of fi rms change wages once a year. As for differences across sectors and fi rms 
of different sizes (Table 6b), there are no sizeable differences in the proportion of fi rms changing 
wages more frequently than once a year, which in all sectors and fi rm sizes is roughly 5%.
The frequency of wage changes was lower during 2010-13 than in the pre-crisis period, 
the data for which are shown in the fi rst block of Table 6a. In 2007, 60% of fi rms reported that 
they changed wages once a year, 26% did so less often, and 12% more often.22 The estimated 
average duration of a wage spell (i.e. a period in which wages remain unchanged) in 2007 was 
15 months, while for the period 2010-13 the average duration among the surveyed fi rms in 
the whole sample of 25 countries was 17 months.23 This general reduction in the frequency of 
wage changes is observed in virtually every country, and is most notable in France, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Spain.
22  See Druant et al. (2012) for evidence on the frequency of wage changes in the pre-crisis period using data from WDN1.
23  The average duration of wage spells is estimated following a similar methodology to that for WDN1 (see Druant 
et al., 2009). The robustness of the results has been assessed by computing duration measures under alternative 
assumptions concerning the number of months corresponding to the frequency intervals that do not directly translate 
into a point estimate. Alternative estimations of duration confi rm the fi nding that the frequency of wage changes has 
declined in comparison with the pre-crisis period.
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SOURCE: Druant et al. (2012) for WDN1; authors’ calculations on the basis of WDN1 and WDN3.
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The large cross-country differences in the frequency of wage changes during 2010-23, 
and the reduction in frequency relative to the pre-crisis period, can be attributed to institutional 
features.24 However, these differences also depend on features typically linked to the crisis, 
such as the incidence of shocks and the resistance of fi rms to cut wages in spite of these 
shocks. Indeed, multivariate analysis shows that base wages are changed less often if fi rms 
experience credit restrictions or a decline in demand, and are reluctant to cut nominal wages. 
In a period in which economic conditions, at least in some countries and sectors, may in fact 
call for wage reductions, the reluctance to cut nominal wages might prevent wage changes as 
fi rms freeze wages instead of cutting them. In addition, institutional features in the labour market 
also contribute to explaining the cross-country differences in wage stickiness. Base wages are 
changed more often in the presence of collective bargaining and internal policies that adapt 
base wages to infl ation.25
5.3 Downward nominal wage rigidity
Downward nominal wage rigidity (DNWR) refers to the reluctance of fi rms to cut nominal wages 
and/or the resistance of workers to accept such cuts. It prevents wage cuts in favour of freezes, 
24  Results from WDN1 clearly showed that the frequency of wage changes is more driven by national institutions than by 
the economic environment; see Druant et al. (2012).
25  See Lamo et al. (2016).
SOURCE: WDN3.
a NACE Rev. 2 sector C.
b NACE Rev. 2 sectors D and E.
c NACE Rev. 2 sector F.
d NACE Rev. 2 sector G.
e NACE Rev. 2 sectors H, I, J, L, M ,N.
f NACE Rev. 2 sector K.
More frequently 
than once a year (%)
Once a year (%)
Less frequently 
than once a year (%)
Never/not applicable (%)
Sector
6.88.939.749.3)a( gnirutcafunaM    
4.114.947.836.0)b( retaw ,sag ,yticirtcelE    
017.147.047.7)c( noitcurtsnoC    
9.92.835.843.3)d( edarT    
6.72.041.841.4)e( secivres ssenisuB    
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Size
1.414.742.534.3seeyolpme 91-5    
5.116.44049.3seeyolpme 94-02    
8.73.04847.3seeyolpme 991-05    
9.5437.555.4seeyolpme +002    
6.84.938.744latoT
FREQUENCY OF WAGE CHANGES ACROSS SECTORS, WDN3 (2010-2013) TABLE 6b
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meaning that fi rms keep base wages unchanged even if economic conditions justify a cut. Few 
average cuts together with a large number of freezes are therefore indicative of DNWR.
The implications that DNWR might have for the choice of the optimal rate of infl ation 
became topical in the pre-crisis period, which was characterised by moderate levels of infl ation 
in the euro area.26 This triggered a growing body of empirical literature looking at whether wages 
were in fact subject to DNWR. Studies using micro data focused on using the distribution of 
wage changes across individual workers (e.g. Dickens et al., 2007) or sectors (e.g. Holden 
and Wulfsberg, 2008) to estimate downward wage rigidity. Following the pioneering work of 
Blinder and Choi (1990), another branch of the empirical literature relied on survey evidence to 
determine the prevalence and sources of downward wage rigidity.
DNWR is also a key factor in facilitating or preventing adjustment to the different 
shocks. During the recent economic and fi nancial crisis, DNWR may have prevented the optimal 
adjustment of fi rms’ labour costs, and may have forced fi rms to adjust employment rather than 
wages, thus contributing to job destruction.27
In addition, in the current period of economic recovery, DNWR continues to be a 
key concern as it may dampen wage increases. In the presence of DNWR, fi rms are also 
likely to moderate wage increases; in a period of low infl ation such as the current one, this 
may trigger second-round effects, further dampening wage infl ation. Elsby (2009) and Stüber 
and Beissinger (2012), among others, argue that although raising nominal wages increases 
workers’ effort and productivity, a wage cut of the same amount will reduce effort and 
productivity by a larger amount, such that reversing wage increases will incur an extra cost in 
terms of productivity. As a consequence, forward-looking fi rms will moderate wage increases 
in the presence of DNWR.28
The three waves of the WDN survey collected information on whether fi rms cut or 
froze the base wages of some of their employees and on the proportion of workers affected. 
Babecky et al. (2012) summarise the evidence on DNWR from WDN1. Fabiani et al. (2015) 
provide evidence from WDN2 on how wage rigidity led fi rms to adjust labour in response to 
shocks during 2008-09, and the current report provides evidence on DNWR for the period of 
2010-13, drawn from WDN3.
Although all three waves of the WDN survey collected information on wage cuts and 
freezes from similar and comparable questions, the length of the reference period for this set 
26  Tobin (1972) claimed that if nominal wages are downwardly rigid, a certain amount of positive infl ation may be needed 
to ease fi rms’ real wage adjustment (i.e. infl ation may “grease the wheels” of the economy).
27  As well as the negative effect on employment, a variety of other consequences of these rigidities during the crisis have 
been pointed out. For example, Favilukis and Lin (2016) argue that during bad times revenue falls, but if wages do 
not adjust then fi rms’ costs fall by less, making fi rms’ cashfl ow more sensitive to aggregate shocks and fi rms more 
prone to risk.
28  The two main reasons identifi ed in the literature for fi rms’ reluctance to cut nominal wages are (i) the belief that nominal 
wage reductions can damage worker morale and effort, and (ii) the possibility that the most productive workers would 
leave as a consequence. See Bewley (1999) and Babecký et al. (2010).
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of questions differed across waves. WDN1 asked whether wages were cut or frozen during the 
fi ve-year period prior to the survey, i.e. mid-2002 to mid-2006 (referred to here as 2002-07), 
which was a period of economic stability and growth. WDN2 covered the incidence of wage 
cuts and freezes during the early phase of the crisis, from the third quarter of 2008 until summer 
2009. Finally, WDN3 collected information on wage cuts and freezes for each year separately, 
covering the four years from 2010 to 2013.
Since the reference periods differ in length, the incidence of wage cuts and freezes 
cannot be directly compared across surveys. Table 7a displays both annual cuts and freezes 
and the percentages of fi rms that cut and froze wages at least once during the period 2010-13. 
The reference period for the latter variable is of a similar length to the reference period of the 
WDN1 data.
Tables 7a-b and Chart 9 provide an overview of the incidence of cuts and freezes of 
nominal base wages among the countries surveyed in each WDN wave.
Cuts in nominal base wages were very rare over the three waves of the WDN survey, 
which prima facie is indicative of DNWR. Only 2.3% of fi rms in the countries sampled in 2007 
(WDN1) reported having cut wages in the previous fi ve years. During the acute phase of the 
crisis, in the second half of 2008 and the fi rst half of 2009, only 3.1% of the surveyed fi rms 
reported having cut wages. The only exception to this pattern from the countries covered by 
WDN2 was Estonia, where 45.8% of fi rms (30% of employees) experienced wage cuts; the 
possible reasons why wage-setting in Estonia differed in 2008-09 are discussed in Fabiani 
et al. (2015).29 The evidence from the WDN3 survey reveals that only 4.5% of the fi rms ever 
cut wages over the four-year period 2010-13. The incidence of wage cuts in each one-year 
period in 2010-13 ranged from 1.3% to 1.9% of fi rms.30 This indicates that wage cuts became 
only moderately more common after the Great Recession than in the pre-crisis period, but 
less common than in 2008-09. There is, however, notable heterogeneity in the incidence of 
wage cuts across countries and across groups of countries; the highest incidence of cuts 
during the 2010-13 period took place in countries in Group III, whereas wage cuts in Group II 
countries were particularly rare. The evidence on cuts combined with the evidence on wage 
freezes reveals the prevalence of DNWR across EU countries. During the second half of 2008 
and the fi rst half of 2009, wage freezes became much more prevalent than in the pre-crisis 
period.31 The share of fi rms freezing wages increased drastically at the start of the crisis, from 
about 10% to 35% in the countries covered by WDN2 in 2009.32 See Chart 9 for information 
on individual countries.
29  Cuts were also severe in other countries that were not included in the WDN2 sample, e.g. Latvia, Lithuania and Ireland.
30  The incidence of wage cuts in terms of affected workers is also very low. In the pre-crisis period (2002-07), on 
average, only about 0.2% of workers a year were affected by wage cuts. During the period 2008-09, in spite of 
the depth of the shock, the incidence of wage cuts increased only moderately, affecting 1.8% of workers. Finally, 
during the period 2010-13 the incidence of wage cuts was also minor, ranging from 0.6% to 0.9% of workers 
per year.
31  Indeed, it is likely that negative demand shocks shifted to the left the wage change distribution.
32  A further 35% of fi rms indicated their intention to freeze wages in the future.
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations on the basis of WDN1, WDN2 and WDN3.
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5.4 Comparisons of DNWR using the Dickens et al. (2007) measure
The measure proposed by Dickens et al. (2007) assesses in a synthetic manner the extent of 
DNWR by combining the evidence on wage cuts and wage freezes. This measure is based 
on the assumption that every employee whose nominal wages were frozen would have had a 
nominal wage cut in the absence of DNWR. The Dickens et al. (2007) measure of DNWR is:
DNWR=f/(f+c)
where f represents the fraction of workers whose wages were frozen and c represents 
the fraction of workers whose wages were cut. The formula shows the share of workers who 
received a wage freeze although it would have been optimal for their fi rm to cut their wages, 
i.e. the fraction of workers subject to DNWR. In the absence of DNWR there would be no wage 
freezes and DNWR = 0, whereas if all wage cuts were prevented then DNWR = 1.
This measure represents a conservative estimate of DNWR (overestimating the actual 
level of DNWR), since it is based on an assumption that every wage freeze would have been a 
wage cut, although it would be optimal to freeze the wages of a certain percentage of workers 
even in the absence of DNWR. Assessing the optimal proportion of freezes in the absence of 
DNWR would require information on the counterfactual wage change distribution or the wage 
change distribution that would prevail if wages were completely fl exible. As the counterfactual 
wage change distribution cannot be deduced on the basis of the WDN survey data, this 
subsection uses the conservative measure of DNWR shown above.33
33  The simulations based on the assumption that under complete fl exibility wage changes are normally distributed show 
that the bias in the measure proposed by Dickens et al. (2007) is relatively small and declines when the estimates 
approach 1. The adjusted measures of DNWR which assume that only 50% of wage freezes represent prevented cuts 
yield similar analytical implications to those based on the original measures provided in Table 8.
SOURCE: Author's calculations on the basis of WDN1, WDN2 and WDN3.
a %HFTQDR@QDVDHFGSDCSNQDkDBSNUDQ@KKDLOKNXLDMS@MCQDRB@KDCSNDWBKTCDMNMQDRONMRDR	@SKD@RSNMBDNUDQSGDODQHNCLHCSNLHCCDjMDC@RRTBG
NVHMFSNSGDENQLTK@SHNMNESGDPTDRSHNMHMSGD6#-RTQUDX		@SKD@RSNMBDNUDQSGDODQHNCLHCSNLHCCDjMDC@RRTBGNVHMFSNSGDRSQTBSTQDNE
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			@SKD@RSNMBDNUDQSGDODQHNCBNMRHRSHMFNEjQLRSG@SQDOKHDCŭXDRŭ@SKD@RSNMBDSNSGDQDKDU@MSPTDRSHNM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
@MC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Table 8 provides an overview of DNWR using the Dickens et al. (2007) measure. The 
fi gures indicate that DNWR is prevalent, as most of the estimates of the Dickens et al. measure 
are close to 1.
A comparison of the pre-crisis years with the post-Great Recession period (2010-13) 
implies that DNWR has become a more binding constraint for fi rms.34 The average value of the 
Dickens et al. measure of DNWR on the basis of WDN1 was 0.81. By contrast, during the years 
34  Recent studies also support this; see, for example, Anderton et al. (2016) and Anderton and Bonthuis (2015).
Group I countries
68.09.09.098.039.098.0cilbupeR hcezC    
88.058.098.098.0ynamreG    
98.097.097.016.056.079.0ainotsE    
69.019.039.029.029.0yragnuH    
88.09.098.048.049.0dnalerI    
49.029.059.097.0aivtaL    
39.029.069.068.018.0ainauhtiL    
69.0169.038.0aikavolS    
    United Kingdom — — 0.84 0.85 0.77 0.71
87.018.068.058.0——I puorG ,latoT
Group II countries
9.069.099.07.0——airtsuA    
99.0119.089.09.0muigleB    
58.09.029.069.0——airagluB    
99.0199.0189.028.0ecnarF    
99.099.069.099.0178.0gruobmexuL    
89.099.0199.019.099.0sdnalrehteN    
39.059.059.059.078.047.0dnaloP    
78.09.049.019.0——ainamoR    
79.089.089.069.0——II puorG ,latoT
Group III countries
66.078.059.089.0——surpyC    
19.029.069.09.049.099.0niapS    
75.064.096.048.0——eceerG    
64.035.065.076.0——aitaorC    
88.049.059.069.069.088.0ylatI    
69.049.049.089.0—89.0lagutroP    
76.0ainevolS    — — — — —
48.068.098.019.0——III puorG ,latoT
Total, all WDN3 countries 0.86 0.95 0.88 0.9 0.87 0.86
WDN3 total for WDN1 sample — — 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.93
DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY, MEASURE BY DICKENS ET AL (2007) TABLE 8
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations on the basis of WDN1, WDN2 and WDN3.
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2010-13 its value ranged from 0.91 to 0.94. This may be caused by the leftward shift of the 
wage change distribution as in most of the countries surveyed average wage growth declined in 
2010-13 by comparison with the pre-crisis period. It is also likely to be related to the much lower 
infl ation that was seen on average across the surveyed countries in the latter period.
The dynamics of the Dickens et al. measure of DNWR in 2010-13 differ across the three 
country groups used in this report. The measure remained mostly stable over this time period in 
the countries belonging to the fi rst two groups. By contrast, it declined gradually over the period 
for most of the Group III countries (with the only exception being Portugal). The largest declines 
took place in the countries that were the most severely affected by the sovereign debt crisis, i.e. 
Greece and Cyprus.
The evidence from the WDN surveys implies that although DNWR is prevalent in 
most countries, it can decline substantially in the event of very strong negative shocks. DNWR 
decreased strongly in countries which suffered GDP declines of 10% or more. This applies to 
Estonia in the period 2008-09 and to Greece and Cyprus in 2010-13.
WDN2 did not cover most of the countries in Group I and the measures of DNWR 
for the Great Recession period are thus missing for most of the group. The coverage of the 
WDN3 survey starts in 2010. Since employment reacts with a lag to changes in output, the 
labour markets were still recovering from the Great Recession at the beginning of the reference 
period for WDN3. It is noteworthy that the DNWR measures were lower for most of the Group 
I countries in 2010 than in the following years. (This was the case in Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia and the United Kingdom.) On the basis of this evidence, it is likely that DNWR 
also declined in these countries during the Great Recession. (There is evidence that this was in 
fact the case for Estonia.)
The WDN-based assessment of DNWR supports the fi ndings of earlier empirical 
studies, which also showed that (nominal base) wage cuts are very rare.35 Moreover, earlier 
studies indicated that nominal wages tend to be downwardly rigid even in periods of economic 
slowdown and near-zero infl ation, where the constraint imposed by DNWR is more binding 
(e.g. Agell and Lundborg,1995). The evidence based on the WDN surveys makes it possible 
to encompass also the countries that were under severe stress. This evidence shows that in 
the event of signifi cant economic decline the constraints imposed by DNWR were relaxed. 
Nevertheless, fi rms usually consider the possibility of lowering the base wages of incumbent 
employees as a last resort after other possibilities of lowering labour costs have been exhausted 
(Fabiani et al., 2015).
5.5 Has it become easier or more difficult to adjust wages since 2010?
The WDN3 survey collected information from fi rms on whether the adjustment of labour costs via 
various margins was easier or more diffi cult in 2013 compared with the situation in 2010. Among 
35  This is shown, for example, by Blinder and Choi (1990), Altonji and Devereux (1999), Bewley (1999) and Babecky et al. 
(2010, 2012).
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other margins, the survey asked fi rms to assess the adjustment of wages. The answers to this 
question can be used to assess changes in wage rigidity on the basis of direct perceptions of 
fi rm managers.
Chart 10 provides an overview of the perceived change in the ease of adjusting wages 
across the sampled countries.36 This graph displays the difference between the share of fi rm 
managers who believed that it had become easier to adjust wages in 2013 as compared 
with 2010 and those who believed it had become more diffi cult. The next section gives a full 
picture of these perceptions. The focus is on those fi rms that observed a change in diffi culty, 
abstracting from those fi rms that found it equally easy/diffi cult to adjust wages. The fi gures 
presented in Chart 10 are mainly negative for countries belonging to Groups I and II, implying 
that the share of fi rms that found it more diffi cult to adjust wages in 2013 by comparison with 
2010 is larger than that of fi rms that found it easier. These fi ndings are in accordance with the 
rest of the evidence from the WDN surveys (discussed in the previous sections), which showed 
that owing to the moderation of wage growth and low infl ation (real) wages have become more 
diffi cult to adjust.
By contrast, the share of fi rms in Group III countries that found it easier to adjust wages 
in 2013 than in 2010 is higher (except in Italy and Croatia) than that of fi rms that found it more 
diffi cult (positive bars in Chart 10). This is most pronounced in Greece, Cyprus and Spain, and to 
a lesser extent also in Slovenia. Here too fi rms’ perceptions are correlated with other measures 
of wage rigidity based on the WDN surveys. In particular, the Dickens et al. (2007) measures of 
DNWR indicated that downward nominal wage rigidity declined over this time period in most of 
the countries belonging to Group III and especially in Greece and Cyprus.
36  A more detailed analysis of these perceptions with regard to adjusting both wages and employment is provided in the 
next section.
SOURCE: Author's calculations on the basis of WDN3.
a 3GDjFTQDRRGNVSGDODQBDMS@FDONHMSCHEEDQDMBDADSVDDMSGDOQNONQSHNMNEjQLRHMCHB@SHMFSG@SHEG@CADBNLDD@RHDQSN@CITRSSGDV@FDRNEHMBTLADMSVNQJDQR
O@XKNVDQV@FDRSNMDVDLOKNXDDR@MCSGDRG@QDNEjQLRR@XHMFSG@SHSG@CADBNLDLNQDCHEjBTKS
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More generally, there is a positive correlation between the initial wage rigidity in 2010 
and the perceived change in the ease of adjusting wages (see the indicators in Chart 10). The 
more rigid were wages at the beginning of the period, the larger was the percentage of fi rms that 
perceived it to be easier (relative to those that found it more diffi cult) to adjust wages in 2013, 
as compared with 2010 (see Chart 11). This suggests a potential role for structural reforms in 
lowering the initial rigidity and thus facilitating the adjustment. The next section explores in detail 
whether labour market institutions are perceived to hinder or facilitate adjustments to shocks, 
and in particular the role of the labour market reforms implemented during the 2010-13 period.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations on the basis of the WDN3 survey.
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6 Labour market reforms and remaining rigidities
As mentioned above, the large rises in unemployment seen in many countries led governments 
to engage in a number of labour market reforms and employment policies.
The main value added of WDN3 in this regard is that it provides information on whether 
fi rms perceive that labour market institutions and employment policies hinder or facilitate 
adjustments to shocks. Moreover, in those countries where signifi cant labour market reforms 
were implemented during the 2007-10 period, there is also information on how fi rms perceive 
the main consequences of these reforms and on the remaining rigidities that they see continuing 
to distort hiring, fi ring and wage-setting decisions.
To put into context these WDN3 results, it is convenient to briefl y summarise the scope 
and extent to which labour market reforms were implemented in EU countries. Annex 2 presents 
the main changes in labour market institutions and employment policies that were implemented 
during the periods 2007-10 and 2010-13. The annex is limited to those policy measures that are 
most likely to affect hiring, fi ring and wage-setting conditions.
As can be seen, labour market reforms took place in many countries. However, since 
labour market outcomes differed signifi cantly across countries, the composition of the measures 
adopted also differed.37 As a rough categorisation of the measures/reforms undertaken, it 
could be said that during the initial phases of the crises, i.e. 2007-10, many countries adopted 
measures aimed at maintaining employment and providing a safety net for the vulnerable. 
As the crisis progressed in those countries characterised by continually disappointing labour 
market outcomes and structural ineffi ciencies, more in-depth reforms were adopted with the 
aim of making labour markets more effi cient – thus reducing unemployment – and increasing 
competitiveness.
As Annex 2 shows, policy action initially involved measures to support the income 
of those affected, e.g. the extension of and increases in unemployment benefi ts (Belgium, 
Latvia and Poland), and measures to maintain employment, e.g. various employment 
subsidies (Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania and Slovakia), as well as incentives 
for employers to employ younger workers (Lithuania) and to recruit and train the long-term 
unemployed (United Kingdom). To maintain employment, short-time work was also used by 
many countries (Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg). Various training programmes 
were also introduced in order to increase the employability of the unemployed (Bulgaria) and 
the low-skilled (Austria) and to enhance the skills of short-time workers during their period of 
short-time work (Germany and Ireland).
37  The intensity and timing of the crisis differed signifi cantly across countries. For instance, the Baltic countries, i.e. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, experienced signifi cant increases in unemployment during the initial phases of the 
global fi nancial crisis and recovered in the following years. In other countries, i.e. Greece, Portugal and Spain, the 
disappointing labour market outcomes continued and intensifi ed during the EU sovereign debt crisis. The labour 
market measures presented in Annex 2 refl ect the differences in timing of the impacts of the crisis.
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Many countries also adopted measures that could be categorised as more structural, 
i.e. measures changing the level of employment protection (Estonia, Romania and the Czech 
Republic), the structure of and eligibility criteria for unemployment benefi ts (Romania, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Poland), and the structure of the collective bargaining 
system (Estonia, Romania and France).38, 39 The adoption of measures of a more structural 
nature that made the adjustment of employment by fi rms easier in some of the countries is also 
confi rmed by the evolution of the OECD’s employment protection (EPL) index (see Table 9). For 
instance, the EPL index for Estonia declined signifi cantly between 2008 and 2013.
However, the largest and most wide-ranging changes occurred in the southern European 
countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) – Group III countries – that suffered the most severe 
shocks in terms of GDP and unemployment.40 In these countries, the reforms were to a large 
extent associated with the adjustment programmes that accompanied the loans they required 
given their diffi cult fi scal positions.41 Ireland, a Group I country, was also under an adjustment 
programme. However, since its labour markets were already fairly fl exible before the crisis (the 
level of employment protection as measured by the EPL index presented in Table 9 is among 
the lowest, for example), the range of measures adopted were in no way similar to those of the 
other programme countries. In contrast to the other programme countries, Ireland saw its EPL 
index actually increase. In Cyprus, a Group III country also under an adjustment programme, the 
labour market measures taken mainly involved employment subsidies, training schemes and the 
suspension of the wage indexation scheme in the private sector.
In Greece, Spain and Portugal, the adjustment of employment has become easier as 
severance pay has been reduced and dismissals for economic reasons have become easier. As 
Table 9 shows, the reduction in the EPL index is signifi cant for these three countries. In Greece, the 
structure of the bargaining system has also changed; fi rm-level agreements, which give fi rms the 
ability to adjust their labour conditions and labour costs according to their needs, can now prevail 
over sectoral/occupational agreements. In Spain, a widening of opt-out clauses gave fi rms more 
leeway to diverge from higher level agreements that generally account for average developments in 
wages and may restrict the ability of fi rms to adjust to idiosyncratic shocks.42 Measures to reduce 
38  While many countries took measures to relax the employment protection of permanent employees, some countries 
opted for more regulation of temporary employment by reducing the duration of each contract and the number of 
renewals (Slovakia and the Netherlands) or introducing redundancy payments for fi xed-term contracts (Slovenia). 
Furthermore, while the general trend was towards less centralisation of wage-setting, some countries took measures 
that introduced sectoral minima into the wage-setting process, e.g. the extension of sectoral agreements in Latvia and 
the introduction of binding minimum wages in many industries in Germany.
39  Most of the structural measures were taken in the second period. Two exceptions are the changes in employment 
protection in Estonia and in the collective bargaining structure in France that took place in the fi rst period.
40  In Italy the most signifi cant reforms took place in 2013-14, after the reference period of the survey. Therefore, it is highly 
unlikely that the current survey will be able to provide an insight on the impact of these reforms.
41  Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal were all under an adjustment programme at some point during the 2010-13 
period. Hungary, Latvia and Romania also received EU/IMF fi nancial assistance in the initial phase of the fi nancial crisis.
42  A change in regulation in Portugal in 2012 required that the subscribing employer associations accounted for at least 
50% of the workers in the sector in order for collective agreements to extend to all sector employees. However, in June 
2014 the introduction of an alternative criterion that is fulfi lled by virtually all employer associations makes the extension 
of collective agreements much easier compared with 2012. Specifi cally, if the most demanding criterion – that at least 
half of the workers in a given sector must be represented – is not met, then the alternative criterion – that a number of 
associated fi rms consisting of at least 30% of micro, small and medium enterprises (fi rms up to 250 employees) are 
covered – needs to be fulfi lled; see Martins (2015).
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labour costs and increase employment were also adopted, e.g. sub-minimum wages for young 
people in Greece, subsidies for new recruits in Spain, a reduction in employers’ social security 
contributions in Greece and a freeze in the minimum wage in Portugal.
Given the wide-ranging reforms that have taken place in some countries, it is useful 
to gather information on the perceptions of fi rms about these reforms. Generally, reforms are 
evaluated on the basis of various indices created by classifying the various elements of the 
underlying legislation (e.g. the OECD’s EPL index). These indicators are very useful as they are 
objective and do not depend on personal judgement. However, fi rm managers can provide 
information about the impact of the legislation on their actual ability to adjust. For this reason, 
WDN3 asked fi rms whether it had been easier or more diffi cult to perform a set of actions in 
2013 than in 2010. More specifi cally, fi rms were asked whether:
— it had become easier or more diffi cult to lay off employees collectively, individually, 
temporarily and for disciplinary reasons and to adjust working hours; this set of 
questions provides an indication of whether it has become easier or more diffi cult 
for fi rms to adjust their labour input;
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Change
(2008-2013)
04.24.24.24.24.24.2airtsuA
09.19.11.21.29.19.1muigleB
Czech Republic 3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1 2.9 2.9 -0.2
9.0-8.18.18.18.17.27.2ainotsE
1.0-4.24.24.24.24.25.2ecnarF
07.27.27.27.27.27.2ynamreG
7.0-1.22.22.28.28.28.2eceerG
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 1.6 -0.4
1.04.14.13.13.13.13.1dnalerI
1.0-7.28.28.28.28.28.2ylatI
Latvia 2.7 2.7
Luxembourg 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 0
Netherlands 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 -0.1
02.22.22.22.22.22.2dnaloP
2.1-2.36.31.41.44.44.4lagutroP
Slovak Republic 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.8 -0.4
1.0-6.26.26.27.27.27.2ainevolS
4.0-22.22.24.24.24.2niapS
United Kingdom 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 -0.2
STRICTNESS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION [INDIVIDUAL DISMISSALS -REGULAR CONTRACTS] – OECD 
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION INDICES
TABLE 9
SOURCE: OECD.
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— it had become easier or more diffi cult to hire employees;
— it had become easier or more diffi cult to move employees to other positions or other 
locations; this set of questions provides an indication of whether it has become 
easier or more diffi cult for fi rms to reorganise their labour input;
— it had become easier or more diffi cult to lower the wages of incumbent workers 
and offer new employees lower wages; this set of questions provides an 
indication of whether it has become easier or more diffi cult for fi rms to adjust 
their wage bill.
In each case fi rms were asked to provide a response on a fi ve point scale: 1= much less 
diffi cult, 2= less diffi cult, 3= unchanged, 4= more diffi cult, 5= much more diffi cult.
Charts 12 to 15 show the proportion of fi rms answering that it has become less 
diffi cult or much less diffi cult to perform each of the above actions.43, 44 In the Group III 
countries, where the most wide-ranging reforms took place, the proportion of fi rms reporting 
that it has become easier to perform the above actions is signifi cantly higher than that of 
the other countries. For instance, around 39% of fi rms in Greece and 29% of fi rms in Spain 
and Portugal say that it has been easier to lay off employees.45 Similarly, 63% of fi rms in 
Greece report that it has become easier to lower the wages of incumbents, while 80% 
say that it has become easier to offer new workers lower wages. In Spain and Cyprus, a 
signifi cant proportion of fi rms state that it has become easier to adjust their wage bill. The 
proportion of fi rms reporting that it has become easier to adjust labour input and reorganise 
the fi rm by moving employees to other places and positions is also signifi cant in these 
countries.
For most of the countries in Groups I and II, the proportion of fi rms reporting that it 
has become easier to perform a certain action is around 20% or below. In these countries, 
however, many fi rms consider adjusting working hours to be much easier than other 
strategies. Many of these fi rms also fi nd it comparatively easier to reorganise labour input by 
moving employees to other locations and positions. In these countries, the majority of the 
remaining fi rms believe that the situation has remained unchanged; the percentage of fi rms 
fi nding it more diffi cult to adjust is signifi cantly lower for all adjustment channels (see Tables 
A3.2 and A3.3 in Annex 3).
43  Throughout the paper, fi rms with fewer than fi ve employees are excluded from the analysis. In Cyprus, a Group III 
programme country, around 27% of fi rms belong to this category. The fi gures presented above for Cyprus are not much 
different when fi rms with fewer than fi ve employees are included in the analysis. The differences are in the range of 1 
to 3 percentage points.
44  The question was slightly different in the Slovenian questionnaire and is not fully comparable, as it included an extra 
option.
45  Firms are asked to answer whether it is less diffi cult or much less diffi cult to lay off employees collectively, 
individually, temporarily and for disciplinary reasons. For expositional purposes, Chart 12 provides the average 
proportion of fi rms across the four channels. Information on each individual channel is presented in Table A3.1 in 
Annex 3.
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PERCENTAGE OF FIRMS REPORTING THAT IT HAS BECOME EASIER TO LAY OFF EMPLOYEES CHART 12
SOURCE: WDN3 survey.
NOTE: Figures weighted to rekect overall employment and rescaled to exclude non-responses.
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SOURCE: WDN3. 
NOTE: Figures weighted to rekect overall employment and rescaled to exclude non-responses.
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Lay-off
employees
Hire
employees
Adjust
working hours
Move
employees to 
other locations
Move
employees to 
other positions
Adjust
wages of 
incumbents
Offer new 
employees
lower wages
5-19 employees 28 24 27 20 25 23 33
20-49 employees 22 22 25 17 23 17 25
50-199 employees 24 24 29 24 30 19 31
200 employees or more 16 18 21 14 21 8 21
FIRMS’ PERCEPTION OF LABOUR MARKET REFORMS: IT HAS BEEN EASIER TO: TABLE 10
SOURCE: WDN3 survey. 
NOTE: Figures weighted to rekect overall employment and rescaled to exclude non-responses.
Percentage of jrms in Group III countries – distribution by size
Tables 10 and 11 show how the perceptions of fi rms differ across sector and size 
categories in the Group III countries, in which a signifi cant proportion of fi rms say that it has 
been easier to adjust labour input and wages. The proportion of bigger fi rms (with more than 
200 employees) perceiving it to be easier to adjust labour input and wages using the above 
measures is consistently lower for all adjustment channels. It may be the case that larger 
fi rms always had the ability to adjust their labour input and wage bill using various margins 
of adjustment and that labour market reforms may not have made a signifi cant difference for 
them. As for the analysis by sector, Table 11 shows that the proportion of fi rms in the energy 
and fi nancial intermediation sectors perceiving it to be easier to adjust labour input and wages 
is lower for most of the channels.
As stated above, the perceptions of the managers answering the questionnaire refl ect 
their opinion about reforms and are based on their actual experience. It is useful, however, to 
check the consistency of these perceptions using other objective indicators. The EPL index 
constitutes one such indicator in the case of lay-offs. Chart 16 shows whether perceptions 
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about the ease of laying off employees are in any way correlated with the evolution of the EPL 
index. In Greece, Estonia, Portugal and Spain, where the reduction of the EPL index is high, 
fi rms perceive it to be comparatively much easier to lay off employees. Similarly, in Greece and 
Cyprus, where wages have adjusted signifi cantly, fi rms perceive it to be comparatively much 
easier to adjust the wages of incumbents and offer newly hired employees a lower wage.
Another question, which was however not included in all countries’ questionnaires, 
asked fi rms to indicate the factors infl uencing their answer to the question on how easy it had 
become to perform certain actions. More specifi cally, fi rms were asked which of the following 
four factors made it easier or more diffi cult to perform certain actions: a) reforms of labour 
laws, b) law enforcement, c) a change in the behaviour of trade unions, and d) a change in the 
behaviour of individuals. Answers to this question are available for ten countries (the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Spain, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland and Romania).
Table 12 shows the modal answer, i.e. the most frequently cited reason for fi rms 
answering that it had become easier to perform an action. For those Group III countries that 
have signifi cantly reformed their labour markets, i.e. Greece and Spain, the most frequently 
Lay-off
employees
Hire
employees
Adjust
working hours
Move
employees to 
other locations
Move
employees to 
other positions
Adjust
wages of 
incumbents
Offer new 
employees
lower wages
Manufacturing 19 20 22 16 22 10 22
Electricity, gas 8 10 15 11 13 9 14
Construction 22 23 22 26 24 17 22
22513241821212edarT
Business service 20 21 25 20 25 15 29
Financial intermediation 13 55 11 19 23 8 7
FIRMS’ PERCEPTION OF LABOUR MARKET REFORMS: IT HAS BEEN EASIER TO: TABLE 11
SOURCE: WDN3 survey. 
NOTE: Figures weighted to rekect overall employment and rescaled to exclude non-responses.
Percentage of jrms in Group III countries – distribution by sector
SOURCES: OECD and WDN3 survey.
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cited answer when it comes to the ability to adjust labour input and the wage bill is the reform of 
labour laws. In Estonia, where employment protection was signifi cantly reduced, fi rms frequently 
cite labour reforms as the factor making it easier for them to adjust their labour input. In Group I 
and Group II countries, with regard to the adjustment of the wage bill, the most frequently cited 
reason is changes in individual behaviour. This is to be expected, since in an environment of 
uncertainty workers are more likely to accept lower wages in order to save their position or enter 
the labour market.
Since signifi cant reforms took place especially in those countries that suffered the most 
severe and long-lasting shocks, many fi rms in these countries believe that it has also become 
easier to adjust their labour input and wage bill. However, what is also crucial at the current 
juncture is how employment will evolve as these countries come out of the crisis. WDN3 asked 
fi rms about their perceptions regarding obstacles to hiring. This question is fairly broad and its 
scope is not limited to the regulatory framework per se (i.e. payroll taxes, hiring and fi ring costs); 
it also collects information on other factors that may infl uence fi rms’ decisions regarding hiring, 
such as the impact of economic uncertainty on hiring and the impact of skill shortages.
More specifi cally, fi rms were asked to rank in terms of relevance (i.e. not relevant, of 
little relevance, relevant, very relevant) the following nine factors: a) uncertainty about economic 
conditions, b) insuffi cient availability of workers with the required skills, c) access to fi nance d) 
fi ring costs, e) hiring costs, f) high payroll taxes, g) high wages, h) risks that labour laws will 
change, and i) costs of other inputs complementary to labour. Tables 13a and b present the 
SOURCE: WDN3.
NOTES: 1 = reform of laws, 2 = law enforcement, 3 = changes in the behaviour of unions, 4 = changes in the behaviour of individuals. Green: reform of law. Red: 
changes in the behaviour of individuals.
a Two reasons are cited most frequently.
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most frequently cited answer for each reason. For expositional purposes, reasons are classifi ed 
in two categories. One category refers to the environment in which the fi rm operates (Table 
13a) and the other to the regulatory framework (Table 13b). Only two reasons are assigned the 
highest relevance score (very relevant) most frequently by fi rms, and this is only the case for a 
few countries. These two reasons are uncertainty and high payroll taxes. The fi rst is related to 
the environment in which the fi rms operate and the latter to regulation.
Interestingly, “very relevant” is the most frequently cited answer when it comes 
to economic uncertainty for some of the Group II and III countries in which unemployment 
increased during the crisis, i.e. Bulgaria, France, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Croatia and Italy. When 
it comes to high payroll taxes, “very relevant” is the most frequently cited answer for countries 
from all three groups, i.e. Latvia, Lithuania, Belgium, Poland, Spain, Croatia, Italy and Slovenia.
Uncertainty
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Economic environment
TABLE 13 A
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These results indicate that uncertainty weighs heavily on fi rms’ decisions to hire 
employees, especially in countries that suffered the most during the crisis and experienced 
an increase in unemployment. High payroll taxes are also a concern in some of the countries 
that saw an increase in unemployment. Employment could thus be expected to increase when 
economic uncertainty is reduced. However, in these countries the positive impact of reduced 
uncertainty may be counterbalanced by the negative impact of high payroll taxes.
The above case is further strengthened by the information presented in Table 14, which 
shows that in many countries fi rms that experienced a decrease in demand assign economic 
uncertainty and high payroll taxes the highest relevance score most frequently.
SOURCE: WDN3.
NOTES: 1 = not relevant, 2 = of little relevance, 3 = relevant, 4 = very relevant. Green: relevant Red: very relevant.
a Two relevance scores are cited most frequently.
Firing costs Hiring costs High payroll taxes High wages
Risk that legal 
framework will 
change
Group I CZ 3 2 3 2 2
DE 1 2 2 2 2
EE 2 2 3 3 2
HU 1 1 1 1 1
IE 1 2 3 3 2
LT 3 3 4 3 2/3 (a)
LV 3 2 4 3 3
MT 1 1 1 3 1
SK 3 2 3 3 3
UK 1 1 1 2 1
Group II AT 1 1 1 1 1
BE 3 2 4 3 3
BG 1 1 3 3 3
FR 3 2 3 3 3
LU 3 2 2 3 2
NL 2 2 3 3 2
PL 3 3 4 3 3
RO 1 1 3 3 3
Group III CY 1 1 1/3 (a) 1 1
ES 3 2 4 3 2
GR 2 1 3 1 1
HR 3 3 4 3 3
IT 3 2 4 2 3
PT 3 2 3 2 3
SI 3 3 4 2 3
OBSTACLES TO HIRING – MOST FREQUENT RANKING OF REASONS (MODAL ANSWER)
Regulatory framework
TABLE 13 B
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Tables 13a and b further show that fi ring costs and high wages are most frequently 
considered to be relevant by fi rms in many countries. Firing costs and high wages are two obstacles 
that relate to labour market regulation. During the recent crisis many countries took signifi cant steps 
towards reducing fi ring costs. As noted earlier, Estonia and Greece are two countries for which the EPL 
index decreased signifi cantly. Indeed, as Table 13b shows, fi rms in these countries most frequently 
consider fi ring costs to be of little relevance. By contrast, in Spain, France, Italy and Portugal, fi rms 
think that fi ring costs constitute a relevant obstacle to hiring. In Cyprus and Greece, countries where 
wages were signifi cantly adjusted, fi rms most frequently consider high wages to be of no relevance.
The availability of relevant skills is most frequently assigned the second highest relevance 
score by fi rms in many countries (see Table 13a). Since this obstacle also relates to other structural 
policies, countries aiming to increase or maintain employment should consider the role of the 
educational system in this.
SOURCE: WDN3.
NOTES: 1=not relevant, 2=of little relevance, 3=relevant, 4=very relevant. Red: very relevant.
a Two relevance score are cited most frequently.
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To sum up, fi rms currently consider uncertainty about economic conditions to be a very 
relevant obstacle to hiring. However, as the economic situation improves, countries aiming to 
improve their employment outlook would also need to consider the impact of high payroll taxes, 
high wages, fi ring costs and the availability of employees with the required skills, a factor that 
cannot be tackled by changes in labour laws alone. A policy mix including education would need 
to be considered.
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7 Concluding remarks
This paper provides cross-country comparisons of the nature of the shocks facing fi rms in the 
wake of the Great Recession and the European sovereign debt crisis, of the fi rms’ adjustments 
to these shocks, of the institutional framework that conditioned employment and wage 
adjustments, of labour market reforms undertaken during the crisis period and of remaining 
rigidities after those reforms. These comparisons are constructed from the information collected 
by WDN3 on a wide variety of fi rm characteristics and their employment and wage changes 
throughout the 2010-13 period.
The wealth of information provided by WDN3 and the many aspects that could 
be analysed when identifying the main reasons behind cross-country differences in fi rms’ 
adjustments to shocks mean that it is not feasible for this report to cover all the results provided 
by the survey. Indeed, researchers are encouraged to make use of the data themselves. The 
wealth of information also makes it diffi cult to summarise even the main results presented in this 
paper in a brief concluding section. Nevertheless, from the main results presented here, it can be 
concluded that i) the information provided by the survey about the nature and size of the shocks 
is consistent with the changes in GDP and unemployment observed across countries, ii) labour 
market institutions conditioned to a great extent the way in which fi rms adjusted to the shocks, 
and iii) despite the labour market reforms introduced in some countries during the crisis period, 
which made it comparatively easier for fi rms to adjust, some obstacles remain, infl uencing fi rms’ 
decision to hire.
These broad and general messages should provide a starting point for further research 
on the WDN3 data, both with a focus on particular countries – building on the country reports 
written by members of the Wage Dynamics Network – and with an international perspective, 
building on some of the cross-country comparisons presented in this paper.
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Annex 1. The WDN survey
The WDN survey offers a unique dataset to explore wage dynamics, accounting for institutional 
features, fi rm-specifi c features and the economic environment in which fi rms were operating. It 
was launched by the Wage Dynamics Network, a European System of Central Banks (ESCB) 
research network focusing on identifying the sources and features of wage and labour cost 
dynamics that are most relevant for monetary policy. The fi rst wave of the WDN survey (WDN1) 
was carried out by 17 national central banks (NCBs) between the end of 2007 and the fi rst half 
of 2008. It collected information on a period of economic stability and relatively stable growth, 
namely 2002-07. In summer 2009, ten NCBs conducted a more focused follow-up survey with 
the specifi c aim of understanding fi rms’ reactions to the initial stage of the crisis (2008-09). This 
was the second wave of the WDN survey (WDN2).
The third wave of the WDN survey (WDN3) was conducted by 25 ESCB NCBs 
between the end of 2014 and the fi rst half of 2015. The aim of the WDN3 survey was to 
assess recent labour market adjustments and fi rms’ reactions to the various shocks and 
labour market reforms that took place during the second phase of the crisis (2010-13). This 
wave collected information from over 25,000 fi rms from the following sectors: manufacturing, 
energy, construction, trade and transportation, market services, fi nancial intermediation and, 
for some countries, non-market services. By design, the sample is relatively balanced across 
fi rm size categories within each country and across the sectors considered. Its distribution 
closely follows the distribution of private employment in each country. However, the sample 
size varies across countries both in absolute terms and relative to the number of fi rms in 
each country. Thus, individual weights have been calculated for each fi rm to make the sample 
representative of the overall number of fi rms in each country and to account for the number of 
workers that the fi rm represents in a given country.
The WDN surveys are ad hoc surveys at the fi rm level that respond to specifi c 
information demands. This feature has resulted in different questionnaires across waves. 
Coverage in terms of countries also varies across waves, as does the sample of fi rms in 
each country. Thus the WDN surveys are not, strictly speaking, different waves of a panel, 
but have led to cross-country datasets with ample geographical and sectoral coverage. 
The main advantage of conducting an ad hoc survey at the fi rm level is its fl exibility. Firms 
can be asked directly about the features of their wage and price setting, their reactions to 
shocks or their perceptions of the effectiveness and impact of reforms: information that 
would otherwise be diffi cult to collect. Where wages are concerned, surveys addressed 
to fi rms typically provide more accurate information than those addressed to households. 
Nevertheless, several shortcomings inherent in ad hoc surveys should be borne in mind, 
such as low response rates and potential misinterpretations of the questions. Moreover, 
responses may be infl uenced by the specifi c macroeconomic environment prevailing at the 
time of the survey.
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SOURCE: Xxxxxx.
a Where Sector 1 = Manufacturing (NACE code C), Sector 2 = Electricity, gas and water (NACE codes D, E), Sector 3 = Construction (NACE code F), Sector 4 = 
Trade (NACE code G), Sector 5 = Business services (NACE codes H, I, J, L, M, N), Sector 6 = Financial intermediation (NACE code K), Sector 7 = Public sector 
services (NACE codes O, P, Q) and Sector 8 = Arts (NACE codes R, S).
National central banks
Sectoral 
coverage (a)
Firms’ size 
(number of 
workers)
No of respondents 
(response rate)
Who conducts 
the survey
How is the survey 
conducted
BE Nationale Bank van België/
Banque Nationale de Belgique
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 1 + 991 (21%) National central bank Traditional mail
BG Bulgarian National Bank 1, 3, 4, 5, 8 5 + 528 (<59%) External company Online, personal 
interviews
CZ  Èeská národní banka 1, 3, 4, 5 10 + 1011 (20%) National central bank Traditional mail, 
online
DE Deutsche Bundesbank 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 1 + 2454 (24.5%) National research body Traditional mail, 
fax
enilno ,enohpeleTynapmoc lanretxE)%8.31( 005+ 18 ,6 ,5 ,4 ,3 ,2 ,1 knaP itseEEE
IE Central Bank of Ireland 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 1 + 1569 (5%) External company Traditional mail
liamEknab lartnec lanoitaN)%8( 204+ 55 ,4 ,1eceerG fo knaBRG
ES Banco de España 1, 2, 4, 5 5 + 1975 (64.8%) External company Online
FR Banque de France 1, 3, 4, 5 5 + 1156 (24%) National central bank Traditional mail, 
telephone
IT Banca d'Italia 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 5 + 1102 (29.4%) External company Online
CY Central Bank of Cyprus 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 3 + 182 (11%) National central bank Traditional mail, 
email
enilno ,enohpeleTynapmoc lanretxE)%72( 755+ 016 ,5 ,4 ,3 ,1aknaB sajivtaLVL
LT Lietuvos bankas 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 5 + 515 (6% approx.) External company -NSRODBHjDC
LU Banque centrale 
du Luxembourg
1, 3, 4, 5, 6 1 + 674 (13.5%) National research body Traditional mail, 
online
HR Hrvatska narodna banka 1, 3, 4, 5 5 + 301 (7%) External company Online, telephone
HU Magyar Nemzeti Bank 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 5 + 2032 (58%) External company Personal interviews
MT Central Bank of Malta 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 10 + 178 (66%) National central bank Personal interviews
NL De Nederlandsche Bank 1, 3, 4, 5, 6 5 + 727 (77%) External company -NSRODBHjDC
AT Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank
1, 3, 4, 5, 6 5 + 784 (>= 20%) National central bank Traditional mail, 
online
PL Narodowy Bank Polski 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 1 + 1200 (27.9%) National central bank Traditional mail, 
online, personal 
contact
PT Banco de Portugal 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 10 + 1282 (28%) National central bank Traditional mail, 
online
RO Banca NaŒionalĖ 
a României
1, 3, 4, 5 20 + 1530 (88%) -@SHNM@KRS@SHRSHBRNEjBe Traditional mail
SI Banka Slovenije 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 5 + 1285 (43%) National central bank Traditional mail, 
online
SK Národná banka Slovenska 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 5 + 621 (7.7%) National central bank Traditional mail, 
email
UK Bank of England 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 1 + 654 (3.6%) National central bank Online, email
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Annex 2. Major labour market reforms across the EU
2007-2010
 2102 ecnis ,yraropmet tsrif( ytivissergorp decudeR :BU.esaercni yraropmeT :BUmuigleB
permanently). Limitation of early exits from labour market.
EPL: Extension of temporary lay-offs to employees (2009). 
Temporary reductions in working time schemes.
$/+4MHjB@SHNMNEDLOKNXLDMSOQNSDBSHNMKDFHRK@SHNMENQAKTD@MC
white-collar status (2014).
Bulgaria EP: Successive cuts in social security contributions 
(2007, 2008 and 2009).
EPL: Regulation of part-time work: transforming part-time 
employment contracts into full-time when the controlling 
authorities establish that work is being conducted outside agreed  
hours without the existence of conditions for overtime work (2012). 
EP: Allocation of funds to programmes seeking to encourage 
employers to create jobs (2008) and employment subsidies to 
employers for green jobs to be offered to unemployed (2010).
EPL: Suspension of the ability of an employer to terminate the 
employment of a worker that has acquired the right to a pension 
(2012).
$/,D@RTQDRSNBNTMSDQSGDjM@MBH@KBQHRHRDMBNTQ@FDLDMS@MC
guarantee of part-time work for more than three months. 
(MSQNCTBSHNMNEkDWHAKDGNTQR@MCU@QHNTRENQLRNETMO@HCKD@UD
(2008, 2010).
CB: Four agreements covering water supply, brewing, the paper 
and pulp industry and the mineral processing sectors were 
extended to all employees by the Minister of Labour and Social 
Policy (2010, 2012).
EP: Introduction of a new reason for terminating employment: 
if the employee receives a pension. (2010)
EP: Training and provision of grants to unemployed to start their 
own business (2012, 2013).
EP: Support for employers in training and retraining of 
employees (2008) and training support to the unemployed 
dismissed RHMBD@R@QDRTKSNEjQLR?
closure/restructuring (2009). Various training programmes 
for the employed in order to improve their career development. 
(2009, 2010). 
EP: Subsidised employment and training for people under the 
age of 29, people with disabilities and unemployed parents with 
children (2012).
EP: Extension of traineeship period for young people that have 
no work experience and have completed their professional 
training in the last 24 months (2010).
EP: Measures to encourage life-long learning of people of all 
ages and improvements in the quality of vocational training 
(2012).
EP: Regulation of remote work and teleworking (2011).
Czech
Republic
UB: Reductions in coverage, duration and replacement rates. EPL: Reductions in severance payments.
UB: Not granted to workers with severance payments.
MW: Increased.
Germany EP: Training programmes for unemployed and short-term 
workers.
CB: Extensions of CB agreements made easier.
CB: Before the crisis (2004-08), many collective agreements 
provided for working time corridors, working time accounts, and 
opening clauses for times of crisis.
"!2DBSNQRODBHjBLHMHLTLV@FDRETQSGDQCHRRDLHM@SDCAX
introducing generally binding minimum wages in further 
industries.
EP: Temporary extension of short-time work. Starting from early 
2009, conditions for employers to use short-time work were 
made more favourable with respect to entitlement duration, 
access and costs.
CB: During the period of extensive short-time work, employers 
NESDMSNOODCTORGNQSSHLDVNQJHMFADMDjSRVHSG@CCHSHNM@K
supplements as stipulated in number of collective wage 
agreements.
"!,NQDkDWHAHKHSX@SSGDBNLO@MXKDUDKV@RHMSQNCTBDCCTQHMF
the crisis through a number of supplementary collective 
@FQDDLDMSRSNQDCTBDVDDJKXVNQJHMFSHLD@MCAXjQLKDUDK
agreements on guaranteeing jobs.
MW: Raising of existing or introduction of sectoral minimum 
wages; widening of sectoral coverage of minimum wages by 
declaring them to be generally binding.
SUMMARY OF MAJOR LABOUR MARKET REFORMS ACROSS THE EU TABLE A2
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 ,2102 ni sesaercnI :WM .sesualc tuo-tpo fo gninediW :BC.8002 dna 7002 ni sesaercnI :WMainotsE
2013 and 2014.
.3102 ni snoitubirtnoc ni esaerceD :BU.9002 ni mrofeR :LPE
UB: Increase in contributions in 2009.
Ireland UB: Duration and replacement rates reduced. UB: Further reductions.
EP: Activation and re-skilling of the unemployed. Various 
training schemes for workers made redundant 
and short-time workers.
MW: Reduced.
Greece EP. Various training programmes and programmes of 
subsidised employment (2007-09).
EPL: Lowering the threshold for collective dismissals (2010).
EP. Efforts to reduce early retirement, e.g. by reducing the 
pension received by those retiring early -before the age 
of 60 (2008).
Shorter notice period for the termination of employment contracts 
(2010) and reduction of severance pay on dismissals (2012).
CB: Firm-level agreements can provide for remuneration and 
working conditions that are less favourable than the sectoral 
agreement - the national general collective agreement still acts as 
kNNQ
CB: Suspension of the extension of occupational and sectoral 
collective agreements to non-signatory parties for the duration of 
the Medium-Term Fiscal Strategy Framework (2011).
EPL. Extension of the duration of temporary work - from 2 to 3 
years (2011).
MW. A statutory minimum wage is introduced -previously it was the 
outcome of a bargaining process (2012).
MW. Sub-minimum wages for workers under the age of 25.
UB. While in 2012 the basic UB declined, as the crisis progressed 
in 2013 there was a change in the eligibility criteria for the provision 
of the UB to long-term unemployed in an effort to strengthen the 
social safety net for the most vulnerable social groups. In addition, 
previously self-employed and currently unemployed workers can 
BK@HLLNMSGKXTMDLOKNXLDMSADMDjSR
EP: Training programmes and employment subsidies for the young 
(2011-2012-2013).
EP. Reduction in employers’ social security contributions (2012).
 dna 0102 ni slassimsid cimonoce riaf fo noitinifed ni segnahC :LPE.noisnetxE :BUniapS
2012 and reduction of severance payments in 20132 Introduction 
NEMDVBNMSQ@BSENQjQLRVHSGEDVDQSG@MDLOKNXDDRHM
(MBQD@RDNEkDWHAHKHSXHMVNQJHMFGNTQR
CB: Changes in extension rules and widening of opt-out clauses.
EP: Incentives for job creation and subsidies for new hires.
France EPL: Introduction of a new contract breach (rupture
conventionnelle)  which depends on both parties’ 
agreement (2008).
EPL: Creation of a personal account containing rights to train 
2TOONQSENQQDBNUDQHMFjQLRSGQNTFGMDFNSH@SHNMRNMV@FDR
and work time (2013-15). Subsidies for hiring young workers under 
permanent contracts (2013).
4!1DENQLNESGDFDMDQ@KRBGDLDENQRNBH@KADMDjSR
to improve work incentives.
UB: Higher social contributions on very short-term contracts (2013).
CB: Improving trade unions’ representation in negotiations 
(2008).
MW: Creation of an independent expert committee to limit 
minimum wage increases.
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Croatia $/+2HLOKHjB@SHNMNEOQNBDCTQDRENQBNKKDBSHUDK@XNEER&QD@SDQ
kDWHAHKHSXQDF@QCHMFjWDCSDQL@MCODQL@MDMSBNMSQ@BSR@MC
VNQJHMFGNTQR
 XraropmDt Eo mroEDR ;)5102 Mi CMa( 2102 Mi RmroEDR LPE)RrDMtrap laiBoR XA( 9002 Mi mroEDR :BCXlatI
DLOKNXLDMS
"!1DENQLAXRNBH@KO@QSMDQR
$/)NAR BSHMSNRTOONQSODNOKDKNNJHMFENQ@INA@MC
QDCTBDSGDSXODNEBNMSQ@BSR
"XOQTR $/5@QHNTRSQ@HMHMFOQNFQ@LLDRENQSGDTMDLOKNXDC
@MCSGDXNTMF
$/$LOKNXLDMSRTARHCHDR@MCU@QHNTRSQ@HMHMFOQNFQ@LLDR
$/(MBDMSHUDRENQjQLRSNGHQDTMDLOKNXDCODNOKD ,62TRODMRHNMNEV@FDHMCDW@SHNMHMSGDOQHU@SDRDBSNQ
"!1DCTBSHNMRNEOTAKHBRDBSNQDLOKNXDDRV@FDR
RtMDmDDrFa larotBDR Eo MoiRMDtWE :BCMoiRMDtWE :BUaiUtaL
$/+$WSDMRHNMNE SXOHB@K"NMSQ@BSR
$/(MBDMSHUDRENQINABQD@SHNM@MCRTARHCHDRENQMDVGHQDR
,6(MBQD@RDRHMGNTQKXQ@SDHM@MC
+HSGT@MHa $/$MSQDOQDMDTQRGHORBGDLDENQSGDTMDLOKNXDC@MC
HMBDMSHUDRSNDLOKNXXNTMFDQVNQJDQR
$/5NTBGDQRXRSDLENQSGDSQ@HMHMFNESGDTMDLOKNXDC@MCMDV
NOONQSTMHSHDRENQUNB@SHNM@KSQ@HMHMF
 mTmiMim DGt Eo MoitaMimrDtDC DGt roE DrTCDBorp Mi DFMaGC :WMDtar tMDmDBalpDr DGt Mi DRaDrBDD BU
V@FD
$/+(MBQD@RDCkDWHAHKHSXENQSDLONQ@QXVNQJ@FDMBHDR@MC
SDLONQ@QXDWO@MRHNMNEU@KHCQD@RNMRENQjWDCSDQLBNMSQ@BSR
+TWDLANTQF $/+"G@MFDRHMRGNQSSHLDVNQJRBGDLDRDWSDMRHNMNE
BNUDQ@FDL@WHLTLCTQ@SHNM@MCDMG@MBDLDMSNEDMSHSKDLDMSR
$/+$WSDMRHNM@MCRB@KHMFTONERGNQSSHLDVNQJOQNUHRHNMR
HMSQNCTBDCHMSGDOQDUHNTRODQHNC
$/$WSDMRHNMNEDLOKNXLDMSRTOONQSBNMSQ@BSRS@QFDSDC@S
XNTMFVNQJDQR%HM@MBH@K@HCSNGHQDKNMFSDQLTMDLOKNXDC
SDLONQ@QHKXRB@KDCTOHMTMSHK
$/,@INQQDENQLNESGDM@SHNM@KDLOKNXLDMS@FDMBX #$,
2SQDMFSGDMHMFNE@BSHU@SHNMQDPTHQDLDMSR(MSGD
FNUDQMLDMSHMSQNCTBDCSGDRNB@KKDCXNTSGFT@Q@MSDDDMRTQHMF
SG@S@KKXNTMFODNOKDFDS@QD@RNM@AKDNEEDQINA@OOQDMSHBDRGHO
NQSQ@HMHMFVHSGHMENTQLNMSGRNEQDFHRSQ@SHNMVHSGSGDM@SHNM@K
DLOKNXLDMS@FDMBX #$,
$/+4MHjB@SHNMNEfAKTDBNKK@Qt@MCfVGHSDBNKK@QtRS@STSDR 4!!DMDjSDMSHSKDLDMSKHMJDCSNBNLOKH@MBDVHSGNAKHF@SHNMR
RTBG@RD@QKXQDFHRSQ@SHNMVHSGOTAKHBDLOKNXLDMSRDQUHBDR
@BSHUDINARD@QBGNQSGD@BBDOS@MBDNERTHS@AKDINANEEDQR
,TST@KNAKHF@SHNMR@MCQHFGSR@QDENQL@KHRDCHMAHMCHMFBNMSQ@BSR
"!3GDHMCDW@SHNMRBGDLDV@RSDLONQ@QHKXBG@MFDCNM
RDUDQ@KNBB@RHNMR
4!#TQ@SHNM@MCQDOK@BDLDMSQ@SDRSDLONQ@QHKXHMBQD@RDC
"!(M@TSTLMRNBH@KO@QSMDQR@FQDDCSN@NMDNEEBG@MFD
SNSGD@TSNL@SHBHMCDW@SHNMLDBG@MHRLONRSONMHMF@MXO@XNTS
HMSN.BSNADQ@SSGDD@QKHDRS KNMFSGDR@LDKHMDRHM
#DBDLADQSGDFNUDQMLDMSCDBHCDCSNONRSONMD@MX
O@XNTSHMSN.BSNADQ(M@CCHSHNMNUDQSGDODQHNC
SN@SHLDRO@MNE@SKD@RSLNMSGRG@CSNDK@ORD
ADSVDDMSVN@TSNL@SHBV@FDGHJDR3GHRLD@RTQDHMSQNCTBDC@
CDE@BSNB@ONEOOENQSGDBNMSQHATSHNMNEV@FDHMCDW@SHNMSN
XD@QNMXD@QMNLHM@KV@FDFQNVSG%TMC@LDMS@KQDRG@OHMFNE
SGDOTAKHBRDBSNQV@FDRDSSHMFLDBG@MHRL
'TMF@QX $/3Q@HMHMFOQNFQ@LLDR@MCjM@MBH@KHMBDMSHUDRENQXNTMFKNV
RJHKKDC
$/"G@MFDRNEQTKDRNEO@QDMS@KKD@UD)NAOQNSDBSHNMOK@MEQNL
SNHMBQD@RDDLOKNXLDMSNEFQNTORVGNRDDLOKNXLDMS
Q@SDRVDQDKNVDQ
4!#DBQD@RDNEQDOK@BDLDMSQ@SD@MCCTQ@SHNMHM
,62HFMHjB@MSHMBQD@RDHM
Malta $/(MHSH@SHUDRSN@SSQ@BS@MCQDS@HMODNOKDHMSGDK@ANTQL@QJDS
DRODBH@KKXVNLDM
$/(MHSH@SHUDRSN@SSQ@BS@MCQDS@HMODNOKDHMSGDK@ANTQL@QJDS
DRODBH@KKXVNLDM
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.decuder noitaruD :BU.seidisbus tnemyolpme fo esaercnI :PEsdnalrehteN
$/+$WSDMRHNMNESGDCTQ@SHNMNEjWDCSDQLBNMSQ@BSRENQXNTMF
people
$/+,@WHLTLCTQ@SHNMNEjWDCSDQLBNMSQ@BSRG@RADDM
reduced, maximum number of renewals has been reduced 
and the interval required between consecutive contracts has 
increased.
 srekrow redlo rof sedisbus Fnirih ,dnuf ruenerpertne FnuoY :PE.seicilop noitavitca FninehtFnertS :BUairtsuA
@MCFQ@MSRENQSGDKNVRJHKKDCSN@BBDRRSQ@HMHMF
$/8NTSGDLOKNXLDMSO@BJ@FDR@MCSQ@HMHMFOQNUHRHNMSN
RTOONQSDLOKNXDQR@MCDLOKNXDDRCTQHMFRGNQSSHLDVNQJ
 eht fo noitarFetni dna noitavitca fo tnemevorpmI :PE.desaercnI :BUdnaloP
TMDLOKNXDC@MCNEDLOKNXLDMSRDQUHBDRHMFDMDQ@K
$/ BSHNMHMSGD@QD@NEKHEDKNMFKD@QMHMF@MCLD@RTQDRSN
improve the economic activity and employability of the 
unemployed and inactive.
$/(MBDMSHUDRENQGHQHMFXNTMF@MCNKCDQTMDLOKNXDC
$//QNFQ@LLDRHMBQD@RHMFSGDO@QSHBHO@SHNMQ@SDNEODQRNMR
over 50 (2008); cancellation of early pensions (2009).
$/-DVQDFTK@SHNMFNUDQMHMFSGDKDMFSGNETMDLOKNXLDMS
ADMDjSRHMSQNCTBDCSNQ@SHNM@KHRDSGDRXRSDL(MRSD@CNE@k@S
ADMDjSQ@SDO@HCCTQHMFSGDVGNKDODQHNCO@XLDMSR@QDMNV
GHFGDQHMSGDjQRSLNMSGR@ESDQQDFHRSQ@SHNM@MCSGDMCDBQD@RD
by about 21%. The maximum period of payments was reduced 
from 18 to 12 months but the minimum period has remained 
TMBG@MFDCLNMSGR
$/ M@MSHBQHRHRO@BJ@FDNELD@RTQDRHMSQNCTBDCkDWHAKD
VNQJHMFSHLDRNKTSHNMR@MCLNQDEQDDCNLENQDLOKNXDQRSN
NQF@MHRDVNQJOQNBDRRDR
$/2TBBDRRHUDQDCTBSHNMNES@WVDCFD
(2007, 2008 and 2009).
/NQSTF@l EPL: Reduction in the notice period for collective dismissals and 
SGDL@WHLTLCTQ@SHNMNEjWDCSDQLBNMSQ@BSR
$/+2HFMHjB@MSQDCTBSHNMNERDUDQ@MBDO@XLDMSR@MCKHFGS
facilitation of dismissal clauses.
"!+HLHS@SHNMRSNDWSDMRHNMRNERDBSNQ@K"!@FQDDLDMSR
CB: New alternative criteria for the extension of sectoral 
@FQDDLDMSRVDQDHMSQNCTBDCL@JHMFDWSDMRHNMD@RHDQ
BNLO@QDCVHSGSGDQDFTK@SHNMHMSQNCTBDCHM
MW: Freeze.
4!"G@MFDRHMDMSHSKDLDMSQTKDR
$/(MBQD@RDCkDWHAHKHSXENQVNQJHMFRBGDCTKDR
Romania 4!4MDLOKNXLDMSADMDjSCTQ@SHNMHMBQD@RDCVGHKDSGDDKHFHAHKHSX
BQHSDQH@ENQSGDTMDLOKNXLDMSADMDjSVDQDSHFGSDMDC@MCSGD
TMDLOKNXLDMSADMDjSCDBQD@RDC
UB: More control of refusal of job offers.
$/(MBQD@RDCjM@MBH@KRTOONQSSNDLOKNXDQRNEEDQHMFSQ@HMHMF. EPL: Extension of trial periods. Restriction on the rollover of jWDC
SDQLBNMSQ@BSR$WSDMRHNMNEL@WHLTLCTQ@SHNMNEjWDCSDQL
BNMSQ@BSR/NRRHAHKHSXNEQDCTBHMFVNQJHMFGNTQRCTDSN
economic reasons.
"!$KHLHM@SHNMNEM@SHNM@KKDUDKNEMDFNSH@SHNM-DVDKHFHAHKHSX
BQHSDQH@ENQjQLKDUDKQDOQDRDMS@SHNM@MCSQ@CDTMHNMB@O@AHKHSXSN
A@QF@HM
Slovenia $/(LOQNUDLDMSRHMSQ@HMHMF@MCDLOKNXLDMSRDQUHBDR. 4!(MBQD@RDHMBNUDQ@FD@MCQDOK@BDLDMSQ@SDR
EPL: Shorter notice period and a reduction in severance 
O@XLDMSR@MCHMSQNCTBSHNMNEQDCTMC@MBXO@XENQjWDCSDQL
BNMSQ@BSR
,63GDRS@STSNQXLHMHLTLV@FDHMBQD@RDCEQNL ©SN©
FQNRRODQLNMSGNQAX
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SOURCES: WDN and LABREF database.
-.3$!QHDECDRBQHOSHNMNEBG@MFDRHMK@ANTQKDFHRK@SHNMQDF@QCHMFBNKKDBSHUDA@QF@HMHMF"!DLOKNXLDMSOQNSDBSHNMKDFHRK@SHNM$/+TMDLOKNXLDMSADMDjSR
(UB) and minimum wages (MW), and the implementation of employment policies (EP).
Slovakia MW: New indexation mechanism, giving social partners 
room to negotiate the increase.
$/+1DRSQHBSHNMRNML@WHLTLCTQ@SHNMNEjWDCSDQLBNMSQ@BSR
@MCL@WHLTLMTLADQNEQDMDV@KRNEjWDCSDQLBNMSQ@BSR
$/+ CNOSHNMNE@LNQDOQDBHRDCDjMHSHNMNECDODMCDMS
DLOKNXLDMS@MCKHLHSRNMSGDQDMDV@KNEjWDCSDQLDLOKNXLDMS
contracts.
EPL: Reduction of dismissal costs.
 ot dereffo sboj emitlluf rof ydisbus a dereffo era sreyolpmE :PE.sboj wen rof seidisbuS :PE
unemployed under 29 years old and over 50 years old.
United 
Kingdom
EP: “Flexible New Deal”, implemented in October 2009 
SG@S@BSDC@R@GHQHMFRTARHCXAXOQNUHCHMFSGDKNMFSDQL
unemployed with intensive support and employers with 
incentives to recruit and train them.
$/-DVQHFGSRENQ@FDMBXVNQJDQRHMBQD@RHMFSGDBNRSSNjQLR
NETRHMFSGHRO@QSHBTK@QSXODNEfkDWHAKDK@ANTQtŰAbandonment of 
the New Deal in October 2010, and introduction in June 2011 of 
the ‘Work Programme’ to replace it.ŰThis programme was also 
@HLDC@SFDSSHMFSGDKNMFSDQLTMDLOKNXDCHMSNVNQJ@MCRN
can be seen as a hiring subsidy.
MW: Minimum wage for an employee aged 22 or over rose 
from £5.52 in 2007 to £5.93 in 2010.
UB: In 2013, the government launched the Universal Credit, 
VGHBGQDOQDRDMSDC@L@INQQDENQLNESGDADMDjSRXRSDL
@EEDBSHMFHMO@QSHBTK@QSGDADMDjSR@U@HK@AKDSNTMDLOKNXDC
workers.
MW: Minimum wage for an employee aged 21 or over rose from 
£5.93 in 2010 to £6.50 in 2014 and public sector wages were 
frozen between 2010 and 2013, since when pay growth has 
been capped at 1%.
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Annex 3. Detailed statistics on firms’ perceptions about labour market reforms
SOURCE: WDN3.
-.3$%HFTQDRVDHFGSDCSNQDkDBSNUDQ@KKDLOKNXLDMS@MCQDRB@KDCSNDWBKTCDMNMQDRONMRDR
/DQBDMS@FDNEjQLR
GrouO "NTMSQX
+@XNEEDLOKNXDDR
BNKKDBSHUDKX
+@XNEEDLOKNXDDR
HMCHUHCT@KKX
+@XNEEDLOKNXDDRENQ
CHRBHOKHM@QXQD@RNMR
+@XNEEDLOKNXDDR
SDLONQ@QHKX
4.64.64.4ZCI OuorG
8.43.50.3ED
EE 16.6 22.9 13.0
HU 10.1 14.1 11.0 10.6
2.215.42.211.9EI
2.116.56.1TL
2.62.74.4VL
0.05.19.19.0TM
5.40.117.85.5KS
8.49.018.85.5KU
0.47.17.39.2TAII OuorG
8.89.15.41.2EB
BG 13.3 15.8 13.7 18.6
0.78.08.16.1RF
8.38.19.33.2UL
NL 17.1 20.1 15.8 17.3
0.89.57.110.8LP
2.61.74.216.6OR
CY 16.9 26.5 8.0 30.0
ES 33.1 41.3 16.6 24.4
GR 43.5 53.4 24.1 33.6
8.017.210.211.7RH
5.712.86.317.9TI
PT 33.0 32.7 17.6 31.0
2.117.69.516.4IS
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SOURCE: WDN3.
-.3$2%HFTQDRVDHFGSDCSNQDkDBSNUDQ@KKDLOKNXLDMS@MCQDRB@KDCSNDWBKTCDMNMQDRONMRDR+@XNEEDLOKNXDDR@UDQ@FDOQNONQSHNMNEjQLRjMCHMFHSDPT@KKX
CHEjBTKSSNK@XNEEDLOKNXDDRBNKKDBSHUDKXHMCHUHCT@KKXSDLONQ@QHKX@MCENQCHRBHOKHM@QXQD@RNMR
/DQBDMS@FDNEjQLR
GrouO "NTMSQX
+@XNEE
DLOKNXDDR
 CITRSVNQJHMF
hours
,NUD
DLOKNXDDRSN
NSGDQKNB@SHNMR
,NUD
DLOKNXDDRSN
NSGDQONRHSHNMR
 CITRSV@FDR
NEHMBTLADMSR
.EEDQMDV
DLOKNXDDR
KNVDQV@FDR
&QNTOI CZ 88 64 87 89 85 77 82
DE 66 44 59 63 66 61 41
163878289527EE
HU 77 69 77 80 79 73 71
IE 69 48 65 73 67 61 50
+T 81 65 81 84 83 66 62
+V 80 53 75 84 78 54 68
MT 88 46 74 80 77 83 67
SK 74 69 75 84 83 71 88
UK 78 51 74 84 84 77 59
AT 79 73 46 65 64 69 58
BE 68 47 63 73 73 54 57
BG 65 69 70 78 69 65 69
FR 74 53 56 72 71 62
+U 84 60 75 76 67 67 62
N+ 68 62 67 72 70 72 62
770809673778+P
RO 82 69 83 86 86 77 83
CY 76 65 63 74 53 44 44
ES 60 67 63 74 61 67 58
GR 59 30 39 63 53 33 18
HR 76 62 72 80 72 69 70
IT 75 67 70 76 71 70 64
PT 63 53 60 60 57 73
SI 25 52 46 36 45 45 36
FIRMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF LABOUR MARKET REFORMS: IT HAS BEEN EQUALLY DIFFICULT TO: TABLE A3.2
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&QNTO(((
Hire
DLOKNXDDR
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SOURCE: WDN3.
-.3$2%HFTQDRVDHFGSDCSNQDkDBSNUDQ@KKDLOKNXLDMS@MCQDRB@KDCSNDWBKTCDMNMQDRONMRDR+@XNEEDLOKNXDDR@UDQ@FDOQNONQSHNMNEjQLRjMCHMFHSDPT@KKX
CHEjBTKSSNK@XNEEDLOKNXDDRBNKKDBSHUDKXHMCHUHCT@KKXSDLONQ@QHKX@MCENQCHRBHOKHM@QXQD@RNMR
/DQBDMS@FDNEjQLR
GrouO "NTMSQX
+@XNEE
DLOKNXDDR
Hire
DLOKNXDDR
 CITRSVNQJHMF
hours
,NUD
DLOKNXDDRSN
NSGDQKNB@SHNMR
,NUD
DLOKNXDDRSN
NSGDQONRHSHNMR
 CITRSV@FDR
NEHMBTLADMSR
.EEDQMDV
DLOKNXDDR
KNVDQV@FDR
CZ 6 28 7 7 7 15 9
DE 29 50 31 30 26 36 52
53119215311EE
HU 12 20 12 10 10 20 18
IE 22 32 20 11 12 29 24
+T 13 26 13 11 9 27 33
+V 14 38 20 13 16 35 24
MT 11 50 19 13 14 15 28
SK 19 21 18 12 12 24 8
UK 14 39 16 12 9 17 32
AT 18 25 35 26 25 28 36
BE 28 48 34 24 22 45 38
BG 20 18 17 13 16 19 15
FR 23 45 42 26 26 37
+U 13 33 20 16 17 29 26
N+ 14 12 9 8 7 19 8
215401515+P
RO 10 20 9 6 6 15 9
CY 3 10 5 1 2 5 2
ES 11 7 6 5 7 13 11
GR 3 16 8 3 4 4 1
HR 13 16 14 6 12 19 15
IT 13 20 13 13 13 26 19
PT 9 16 7 9 8 14
SI 2 8 3 3 3 4 2
FIRMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF LABOUR MARKET REFORMS: IT HAS BEEN MORE/MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO: TABLE A3.3
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Abbreviations
Countries
BE Belgium HR Croatia PL Poland
BG Bulgaria IT Italy PT Portugal
CZ Czech Republic CY Cyprus RO Romania
DK Denmark LV Latvia SI Slovenia
DE Germany LT Lithuania SK Slovakia
EE Estonia LU Luxembourg FI Finland 
IE Ireland HU Hungary SE Sweden
GR Greece MT Malta UK United Kingdom
ES Spain NL Netherlands US United States
FR France AT Austria 
In accordance with EU practice, the EU Member States are listed in this report using the 
alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
Others
BIS Bank for International Settlements EUR euro
CPI Consumer Price Index GDP gross domestic product
DG ECFIN Directorate General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs, European 
Commission
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices
ECB European Central Bank i.i.p. international investment position
EDP excessive defi cit procedure ILO International Labour Organization
EER effective exchange rate IMF International Monetary Fund
EMI European Monetary Institute MFI monetary fi nancial institution
EMU Economic and Monetary Union MIP macroeconomic imbalance procedure
ERM exchange rate mechanism NCB national central bank
ESA 95 European System of Accounts 
1995
OECD Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development
ESCB European System of Central 
Banks
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board TSCG Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union
EU European Union
Conventions used in the tables
“-” data do not exist/data are not applicable
“.” data are not yet available
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